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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to develop an instruc-
tional unit in business law on the topic of contracts. The 
unit was constructed for presentation on the business college 
level although it may be adapted to the high school course 
by means of omitting those areas which are considered too 
advanced for that level. 
Justification of the Problem 
Business or commercial law is included in the curricu-
lum of most high school business programs and is a require-
ment in virtually all of the business colleges. There is a 
growing realization of the need of our future consumer-
citizens to have an awareness of the basic legal rights and 
duties which are an integral part of our society. There 
seems to be unanimity of thought that the area in business 
law which should be given the greatest attention is that of 
contracts. 
It is felt by this writer that the unit method in 
teaching business law is more effective than other methods 
Boston Universitv 
School of Education 
LibraTY. 
which are sometimes used. 
Sister Mary of Saint Jeanne Ita1 cites the following 
as the outstanding advantages of the unit method: 
1. It provides for individual differences in an easy 
and natural manner. 
2. It helps to develop student initiative and self-
confidence. 
3. It promotes a better teacher-pupil relationship. 
4. It facilitates the checking of student progress. 
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5. It leaves the teacher free to circulate and devote 
more time to the students who need special help. 
This writer has attempted to keep these points in mind 
in the preparation of the unit. 
Discussion of Terms 
The terms used in the body of the unit and their usages 
are in conformity with those which are to be found in any 
modern text on the subject of business law. In like manner, 
words and phrases peculiar to the law of contracts are defined 
in the body of the.unit, ~sually at the point where they are 
first discussed. 
Almost all footnotes in the unit refer to court decisions 
in standardized form which may be illustrated as follows: 
1sister Mary of Saint Jeanne Ita (Vezeau), Unit Organization 
of Two Topics in Business ~: Agency and-rnBurance, 
TinpUbiished Master's Major Project, Boston University, 
Boston, Massachusetts, 1955, p. 2. 
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Jones v. Smith, 250 Mass. 21. 
In each citation, the name which appears first is that 
of the plaintiff. The "v." which follows it is the abbnevi-
ation for "versus" and the name which immediately follows is 
that of the defendant. The first number which appears refers 
to the volume of the reports in which the case is to be found, 
and the second number denotes the page on which it is to be 
found. The word or phrase which separates the numbers indi-
cates the state or jurisdiction which decided the case. In 
the example given, then, it is known that the cited case 
appears in volume 250 of the Massachusetts reports on page 
21. 
In most instances, the more important cases are set 
forth in more than one place. With this in mind, the writer 
has indicated in most instances an alternative source which 
may be examined by the reader if it should prove more con-
venient. 
The following is a list of abbreviations used frequently 
in the body of the unit and in the footnotes, which, it is 
hoped, will be useful to the reader in the event that further 
discussion on the topics discussed is desired. The list is 
complete as given on the following two pages: 
TERM 
A. 
A.2d 
Ala. 
Am. Dec. 
Am. Rep. 
Ariz. 
Cal. 
Cal. App. 
c.c.A. 
Colo. 
Conn. 
Gush. 
F. 
F.2d 
Fla. 
G.L. 
Ga. 
H & C 
Ill. 
Ill. App. 
Ind. 
K.B. 
Kan. 
Ky. 
L. Ed. 
Mass. 
Md. 
Me. 
Mete. 
Mich. 
Minn. 
Misc. 
Mo. 
EXPLANATION 
Atlantic Reporter 
Atlantic Reporter, Second Series 
Alabama 
American D~cisions 
American Reporter 
Arizona 
California 
California Appellate Reporter 
Circuit Court of Appeals 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Cushing; Massachusetts Reporter 
Federal Reporter 
Federal Reporter, Second Series 
Florida 
General Laws 
Georgia 
Horn & Hurlstone, English Reports 
Illinois 
Illinois Appellate Division 
Indiana 
King's Bench, English Court 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Lawyer's Edition 
Massachusetts 
Maryland 
Maine 
Metcalf Massachusetts Reporter 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Miscellaneous Reports, New York 
Missouri 
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TERM 
N.D. 
N.E. 
N.E.2d. 
Neb. 
N.H. 
N.J. 
N.J •. Eq •. 
N.J. Misc. 
N.M. 
N.Y. 
N.Y.S. 
Okla. 
Ore. 
P. 
Pa. 
Pa. Super. 
Pick. 
S.C. 
s.ct. 
S.E. 
So. 
s.w. 
S.W.2d, 
Tex. 
Tex. Civ. App. 
u.s. 
u.s.c.A. 
Va. 
vt. 
Wash. 
Wheat. 
Wis. 
EXPLANATION 
North Dakota 
Northeastern Reporter 
same; Second Series 
Nebraska 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Jersey, Court of Equity 
New Jersey, Miscellaneous Reporter 
New Mexico 
New York 
New York Supplement 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pacific Reporter 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania Superior Court 
Pickering's Massachusetts Reports 
South Carolina 
United States Supreme Court 
Southeastern Reporter 
Southern Reporter 
Southwestern Reporter 
same; Second Series 
Texas 
Texas Civil Appellate Court 
United States Reports 
United States Code Annotated 
Virginia 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wheaton's Massachusetts Reports 
Wisconsin 
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Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into four chapters. Chapter I, 
the introduction, contains the statement of the problem, the 
justification of the problem, and a discussion of terms. 
The second chapter outlines the procedures followed in the 
construction of the unit. The third chapter contains a 
general statement of the unit and the delimitation of the 
unit, as well as a mastery test to evaluate pupil achieve-
ment. The fourth chapter is devoted to suggestions for the 
teaching of the unit. 
CHAPTER II 
PROCEDURES 
The following procedures were utilized in the prepara-
tion of this unit: 
1. Various sources were examined in connection with 
the more effective methods of unit presentation. 
More specifically, the suggestions of Billett1 
became the foundation upon which the unit was con-
structed. 
2. A number of theses which dealt with the preparation 
of units were studied and their individual approaches 
evaluated. 
3. Considerable attention was devoted to the objectives 
of the unit and the manner in which they could best 
be accomplished. 
4. A number of business law texts and law dictionaries, 
suitable for teaching on the college level, were 
examined as a basis upon which to frame the unit. 
5. The delimitation was prepared containing the prin-
ciples and concepts necessary for complete presentation 
1Billett, Roy 0., Fundamentals of Secondary School Teaching, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1940. 
.. 
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The delimitation is for the teacher's use only. 
6. Although the law of Massachusetts is emphasized, 
extensive use was made of the Boston University 
School of Law Library in order that a representa-
tive number of legal authorities from other states 
might be included in the unit. 
7• A mastery test and key were developed in order to 
give the instructor a tool by which he might measure 
the achievement of the student. The examination is, 
for the most part, objective in nature. 
8. A series of instructional guides and teaching sug-
gestions was evolved in the hope that they might be 
of some use in the presentation of the unit • 
CHAPTER III 
UNIT PRESENTATION 
General Statement of the Unit 
It is fund~ental that no civilized society may exist 
without a realization of the concept of the binding agree-
ment. The legally enforceable promise is the basis of all 
social relationships. Since the ability to rely upon the 
promises of others is basic, it becomes a virtual necessity 
for the individual, working and living in our society, to 
have a fundamental understanding of the legal principles 
inherent in agreements of a contractual nature. An under-
standing of the law of contracts is, to a good extent, an 
understanding of the entire field of commercial law. 
Delimitation 
I. Nature and Kinds of Contracts 
A. Definition of a Contract 
1. A contract may be defined as "a transaction 
between two or more persons, in which each party 
becomes under an obligation to the other, and 
each reciprocally acquires a right to whatever 
10 
is promised by the other. 1 
2. The definition which this writer feels to be 
the most comprehensive is that a contract is a 
"promissory agreement between two or more per-
sons that creates, modifies, or destroys a 
legal relation." 2 
3. While no uniform definition of the term "con-
tract" exists in the sense that it is accepted 
by all authorities, there is general agreement 
as to the elements necessary to constitute a 
valid contract. These may be stated as follows: 
a. agreement 
b. assent of the parties 
c. valid consideration 
d. lawful object 
e. competent parties 
f. required legal form 
B. Nature of Contracts 
1. With a few notable exceptions, a contract may 
come into existence by virtually any means of 
communication. For the most part, oral contracts 
are as effective as written ones. 
1Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 654. 
2Buffalo Pressed Steel Co. v. Kirwan, 138 Md. 60. 
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2. Generally, parties to a contract are prone to 
put their agreement into writing even when the 
law does not impose this requirement. The 
obvious reason for so doing lies in the compar-
ative ease with which the essentials of the 
contract may be proved. 
3. Printed forms are used to create contractual 
obligations in certain common business transac-
tiona such as a conditional sales contract or 
a life insurance policy. 
4. The law may restrict or even deny the right to 
enter into certain types of contracts. Thus, 
an agreement to pay a witness more than the 
regular witness fee allowed by law, or to pro-
mise him a greater amount if the party wins, 
is void. 1 
c. Parties to a Contract 
1. A person who obligates himself to perform under 
a contract or to confer a legally enforceable 
benefit is called an "obligor." 
2. The intended recipient of the performance indi-
cated in the contract or the benefit to be 
conferred is called the "obligee." 
3. There may be more than one obligor or one 
1Pelkuy v. Hodge, 112 Cal. App. 424. 
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obligee as parties to the same contract. This 
is illustrated where joint owners of an auto-
mobile agree to sell it to a third party. 
4, The parties to a contract may be artificial 
legal entitie~ as when a corporation enters 
into a binding agreement with another corpora-
tion, partnership, or natural person. 
5. In certain specific types of contracts, the 
parties may be known by names other than obligor 
and obligee. In a lease, they are referred to 
as landlord and tenant. In a sale, they are 
known as buyer and seller, or vendor and vendee. 
Nevertheless, these are contractual obligations. 
D. Formal and Simple Contracts 
1. Contract under Seal 
a. At common law, a seal was an impression 
upon wax, wafer, or some other tenacious 
substance capable of being impressed,1 
b. At present, in most states, there are two 
ways in which an instrument may be con-
sidered to be sealed: 
(1) By the phrase "witness my hand and 
seal" followed by signature or signa-
tures of the parties. 
1
solon v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank, 114 N.Y. 132; 21 N.H. 
168. 
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(2) By placing the letters "L.S."1 after 
the signature or signatures of the 
parties. 
c. Significance of a contract under seal 
(1) The statute of limitations is raised 
from six years to twenty years. 
2. Contracts of Record 
a. A contract of record is defined as a judg-
ment of a court entered upon its record. 
b. Actually, this is a fiction of law, since 
it is not an obligation voluntarily entered 
into and is, therefore, outside the nature 
of a contract. 
c. In the practice of several states, a spe-
cies of bail bond, called a recognizance, 
is considered a contract of record.2 
3. All contracts which are not under seal or con-
tracts of record are referred to as simple 
contracts. 
E. Express and Implied Contracts 
1. Express Contract 
a. It is an actual agreement of the parties. 
b. The terms are openly uttered or declared 
at the time of making the contract. 
Latin phrase, locus sigilli, meaning "place of the seal." 
2Modern Finance Co. v. Martin 311 Mass. 509; 42 N.E. 2d 553, 
534. 
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c. The language is distinct and explicit. 
d. It may either be oral or in writing. 1 
2. Implied Contract 
a. "An implied contract is one not created 
or evidenced by the explicit agreement of 
the parties, but inferred by law as a 
matter of reason and justice from their 
acts or conduct, the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction making it a 
reasonable, or even necessary, assumption 
that a contract exist~d between them by 
tacit understanding. 112 
b. "If a person saw, day after day, a laborer 
at work in his field doing services which 
must be done of necessity inure to his 
benefit, knowing that the laborer expected 
pay for his work, when it was perfectly 
easy to notify him if his services were 
not wanted, even if a request were not 
expressly proved, such a request, either 
previous to or contemporaneous with, the 
performance of the services, might fairly 
be inferred."3 
c. It may be inferred from these as well as 
other leading cases that silence coupled 
with other conduct or circumstances may 
be constituted as a binding acceptance if 
it leads the offeror to reasonably believe 
that there was assent. 
F. Quasi-contract 
1. "It is not in fact a contract, but an obligation 
which the law creates in the absence of any 
agreement, when and because the acts of the 
parties or others, have placed in the possession 
1A. J. Yawger & Co. v. Joseph, 184, Ind. 228; 108 N.E. 774, 775. 
2Miller's Appeal, 100 Pa. 568; 45 Am. Rep. 394. 
3nay v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513; 20 A. Rep. 347. 
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of one person money, or its equivalent, under 
such circumstances that in equity or good con-
science, he ought not to retain it."1 
2. "Duty, and not a promise or agreement or inten-
tion of the person sought to be charged, defines 
the quasi-contract. n 2 
3. Some courts view quasi-contracts as a means of 
avoiding a strict interpretation of the law of 
contracts when such an interpretation would 
create a great injustice to one of the parties."3 
4. Most legal authorities claim that the quasi-
contract rests on the principle that a person 
ought not to unjustly enrich himself at the 
expense of another. It comes into being only 
when no contract, express or implied, exists. 
G. Valid, Voidable, and Void Contracts 
1. A valid contract is one having legal force, 
executed with proper formalities, and incapable 
of being overthrown or set aside. 
1Edwards v. O'Neal, Tex. Civ. App.; 28 S.W.2d 569, 572. 
2
nrude v. Curtis, 183 Mass. 317; 67 N.W. 317. 
3National Union Indemnity Co. v. Bruce Bros. Inc., 44 Ariz. 
38 F.2d 648, 652. 
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2. A voidable contract exists when one party has 
the option of whether the contract is to be a 
binding obligation or a nullity. 
3. A void contract is an agreement which the law 
refuses to enforce under any circumstances. 
H. Executed and Executory Contracts 
1. An executed contract is one where nothing remains 
to be done by either party to the contract, and 
where the transaction is completed the moment 
the agreement is made, such as in a cash sale. 
2. An executory contract is one in which some 
future act must be done by one or both parties, 
as in the case of goods sold on credit. 
3. An executory agreement becomes an executed 
contract at the moment when all obligations on 
both sides are discharged. 
II. The Agreement 
A. Creation of the Agreement 
1. An agreement is the result of an offer and an 
acceptance of that offer. 
2. The older cases stressed the need of a so-called 
"meeting of the minds" in order to create an 
agreement. 1 
3. The modern view, now accepted in most states, 
1Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247; 88 N.E. 835. 
1 
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is not whether the minds of the parties met, 
but whether under the circumstances, one party 
was reasonably entitled to believe that there 
was an offer and the other to believe that 
there was an acceptance. 1 
B. Requirements of an Offer 
1. An offer expresses the willingness of the 
offeror to enter into an agreement regarding 
a particular subject. 
2. "An offer is an act on the part of one person 
whereby he gives to another the legal power 
of creating the obligation called contract."2 
3. The offer must be definite and certain. To 
constitute an enforceable contract, it is essen-
tial that its nature and the extent of its 
obligations be certain. This is illustrated 
below: 
a. "An agreement between a lessee and a lessor 
that the latter would pay 'his share' of 
the cost of certain repairs was held too 
indefinite to impos~ an obligation and 
was unenforceable."~ 
Whitney v. Wynn, 101 U.S. 396; 25 L. Ed. 1050. 
2m re Larney's Estate, 148 Misc. 871; 266 N.Y.S. 564. 
3Thall v. Berkowitz, 265 Mass. 335; 63 N.E. 876. 
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b. "It is impossible from the letter itself 
to determine what the intestate meant by 
the word 'slice.' In its ordinary use, 
it signifies an indeterminate part or 
portion, with a variable significance 
meaning more or less. 1 It is never used as an exact measure." 
4. Where the offer is ambiguous so that either of 
two meanings is reasonable, no contract arises 
when the offeror intends one meaning, and the 
offeree, in accepting, intends another. The 
following are illustrations: 
a. Where two parties agreed to ship goods on 
a boat called "Peerless," and one party 
meant one ship and the other party meant 
another, both by the same name, there was 
held to be no contract. "It is impossible 
to determine what was intended to be 
expressed from the manifestations of assent 
alone that the parties have employed. If 
both parties are equally blameless for the 
misunderstanding, one should not be pre-
ferred over the other.n2 
b. Where a buyer received quotations for two 
grades of potatoes, and without specifying, 
ordered a carload, intending the cheaper 
grade, no contract was formed when the 
seller sent the better grade.3 
5. In order to give rise to an offer, there must 
be an intention of creating a legal obligation. 
Invitations to social affairs are, therefore, 
1Read v. McKeague, 252 Mass. 162; 147 N.E. 585. 
2Raffles v. Wichelhous, Court of Exchequer; 2 H & C 906. 
3Mutual Sales Agency v. Henri, 145 Wash. 236; 259 P. 712. 
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not considered to be "offers" in the eyes of 
the law. The acceptance of a social invitation, 
such as to dinner, a party, or a wedding, does 
not give rise to a legally binding agreement or 
contract. 
6. If a person is in an abnormal state of anger, 
enthusiasm, or excitement when he makes an offer, 
it is generally held that such an offer is in-
capable of being accepted. If both parties 
understand, or if reasonable men under given 
circumstances would understand, that the trans-
action is to be without legal force, the law 
does not impose an obligation on either. The 
following are illustrations: 
a. A owned a $15 set of harness, which was 
stolen from him. While in a state of wrath 
and in a boastful manner, he proclaimed, 
in the presence of witnesses, that he would 
pay $100 to the one who should discover the 
thief. B, who heard the statement, appre-
hended the thief and sued for the reward. 
The court held that there was no contract. 
"We think that the plaintiff had no right 
to assume that the defendant intended to 
legally bind himself under these circum-
stances."! 
b. B, as a "frolic and banter," gave a $300 
check for a watch worth about $15. B had 
no money in the bank and intended to insert 
a condition in the check rendering him not 
liable. This he neglected to do. S sued 
!Higgins v. Lessig, 49 Ill. App. 459. 
on the check. It was 
no contract. S, as a 
should not have taken 
seriously."! 
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held that there was 
reasonable person 
the transaction 
7. An offer to negotiate, or a mere inquiry, may not 
be accepted so as to constitute a contract. A 
person may indicate his willingness to appraise 
offers in connection with a given subject matter 
without legally binding himself. In so doing, 
he is merely extending an invitation to negotiate. 
a. A may say to B, "What would you give for 
my car?" This is merely an invitation to 
negotiate. If B should elect to make an 
offer, A is in the position of an offeree 
in determining whether or not to accept 
the offer. 
b. "Catalogues, handbills, advertisements and 
circulars describing articles for sale, 
are normally interpreted to be invitations 
to negotiate rather than offers. The rea-
son for this rule is the practical consider-
ation that since a seller does not have an 
unlimited supply of any commodity, he could 
not possibly intend to make a binding con-
tract with everyone in the world who sees 
his circular."<:! 
c. Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts 
1. The offeror may call upon the offeree to make a 
promise or to perform an act. 
2. A bilateral contract is defined as "one containing 
mutual promises between parties; each party being 
1Keller v. Holderan, 11 Mich. 248; 83 Am. Dec. 737. 
2Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Johnson, 209 Mass. 89; 95 N.E. 290. 
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both promisor and promisee."1 
a. If A says to B, "I will pay you five dollars 
if you will promise to shovel my walk," a 
return promise is desired by A. The con-
tract comes into existence at the moment B 
makes the requested promise. 
b. A bilateral contract is commonly referred 
to as a "two-sided" contract because one 
promise is given in exchange for another 
promise. 
3., A unilateral contract arises where one party 
promises to do something in consideration of the 
other party performing an act. 
a. If A says to B, "I will pay you five dollars 
if you will shovel my walk," an act, not a 
promise, is desired by A. The contract 
comes into existence when the act is done. 
b. In a unilateral contract, acceptance and 
performance by the promisee takes place 
simulatenously. 
D. Nature of the Acceptance. 
1. In the law of contracts, compliance by the offeree 
with the terms and conditions of the offer, con-
stitutes acceptance. 
2. An offer may be accepted only by the person to 
whom it is directed. If any other person attempts 
to accept, there would be no contract since the 
offeror never intended to deal with another 
individual. 2 
lAden v. Dalton, 341 No. 454; 107 S.W.2d 1070, 1073. 
2Rodcliff v. Dallinger, 141 Mass. 1; 4 N.E. 805. 
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3. The offeror may choose to make his offer to a 
particular class, in which case, any person 
within the designated class may accept and cre-
ate a binding obligation. An example would be 
in the instance where a manufacturer offers to 
sell his goods at a special discount to any 
customer residing in Boston. 
4. The offeror may direct his offer to the public 
at large, as in the case of a person offering 
a reward for the return of a lost article. 
5. The offeror may dictate the exact method by which 
his offer is to be accepted. If the offeror 
indicates a particular method of acceptance, 
acceptance by any other means is ineffective. 
6. Generally speaking, the offeree in a unilateral 
contract, indicates acceptance by performance 
of the act called for by the offeror. 
7• If the offeror does not specify a particular 
method of acceptance in a bilateral contract, 
acceptance by any reasonable means is effective. 
This is illustrated as follows: 
a. "Acceptance of the offer need not be ex-
pressed unless required by the offeror, but 
may be shown by any words or acts indicating 
the offeree's assent to the proposed bargain."1 
1Prescott v. Mutual Ben. Health and Accident Ass'n., 133 Fla. 
510; 183 Sc. 311. 
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b. "The acceptance may take the form of a 
signature to a written agreement or a nod 
of the head. No formal procedure ~s re-
quired by the laws of acceptance." 
8. When the agreement takes the form of a written 
instrument, the acceptance is effective only 
when the document is signed and delivered, unless 
it was clearly the intention of the parties that 
the earlier verbal agreement be binding, and 
that the writing act merely as a memorandum or 
better evidence of their oral contract. 
9. A majority of the states, including Massachusetts, 
hold that the offeree may not accept an offer 
unless he knows of its existence at the time of 
the acceptance. This rule is of particular sig-
nificance in the so-called "reward cases." 
Assume B returns a lost article to its owner or 
apprehends a criminal without knowledge of an 
offer of reward. Most states reject the right 
of B to claim the reward since there can be no 
basis for a contract unless the offeree acts in 
reliance upon a known offer. A minority of the 
states follow the English view where knowledge 
of an offer is not necessary in order to accept 
it and make a binding contract. All that the 
1New Haven Tile & Floor Covering Co. v. Roman, et al., 137 
Conn; 78A.2d 336. 
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offeree has to do is live up to the terms of the 
offer. Motives are not to be considered. A few 
states accept the majority view in modified form. 
They make an exception only in the area of re-
wards upon public policy consideration. 
10. Generally, acceptance must be expressed by some 
positive action. Silence normally cannot be con-
strued to be an acceptance. There are, however, 
two major exceptions to the general rule. 
a. In the case of prior dealings between the 
parties, the offeree may have a duty to 
reject an offer expressly, and his silence 
may be regarded as an acceptance. An exam-
ple might be where a magazine publisher 
sends the magazine to a customer after the 
termination of the subscription period. 
The customer may be held liable for these 
new issues unless he notifies the publisher 
of his wish to terminate the agreement.l 
b. Where there is no history of past dealings 
between the parties and unsolicited goods 
are sent, the recipient may be deemed to 
have accepted them if it can be shown that 
he made use of them. An example would be 
in the situation where an individual re-
ceives an article of clothing which was not 
ordered. If the recipient makes use of the 
clothing, an acceptance is said to take 
place. 
11. If the offeror specifies a time limit for the 
acceptance of his offer, acceptance at a later 
time is ineffective. In the event that the of-
feror does not specify a time limit, acceptance 
!Prospect News Printing Co. v. Swindle, 15 S.W.2d 922. 
12. 
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must take place within a reasonable time, 
If the offeror specifies the necessity of a 
reply by mail or telegraph, the question arises 
as to when the acceptance is effective. The 
rule followed in almost all the states is that, 
in such a case, acceptance is effective when it 
begins its journey to the offeror. The follow-
ing will illustrate this point that the accep-
tance is effective when it begins its journey 
to the offeror: 
a. A makes an offer to B, requ~r~ng the accep-
tance to be by mail. At the moment that B 
drops the letter into the mail box, properly 
stamped and addressed, the acceptance takes 
place and a binding obligation comes into 
being. 
b, Acceptance sent by telegraph takes effect 
at the time that the message is handed to 
the telegraph office, 
c, Where there is no indication that mail or 
telegraph is not a proper method, an accep-
tance may be made by these instrumentalities 
without regard to the manner in which the 
offer was made, 
d, If the offeror specifies that an acceptance 
shall not be effective until received by 
him, the law will respect his wishes and 
there is no contract until the offeror 
actually receives the acceptance, 
e. Where A manifests to B his willingness to 
buy, and B manifests to A his willingness 
to sell in letters which cross in post, 
there is no contract because there can be 
no assent to an offer not yet received, 
f. 
g. 
h. 
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If the offeror selects the means of commu-
nicating acceptance, he assumes the risk 
of errors and loss caused by the means he 
has chosen. In such a case, a valid accep-
tance lost in the mails is effective even 
though it never reaches the offeror. 
Some jurisdictions hold that an unauthor-
ized means of acceptance is effective if 
received within the same period of time 1 which the authorized means would have taken. 
Questions of whether or not there was an 
acceptance and, if so, when it took place 
are determined by the jury, if civil action 
should be brought on the contract. 
13. The acceptance must be absolute and unconditional. 
It must accept exactly what is offered. If the 
answer changes any term of the offer, it is not 
an acceptance because it does not agree with 
what is offered. Such a variance is termed a 
counter-offer, the effect of which is to destroy 
the original offer. 
a. "It is elementary law that an offer must 
.be accepted in the terms in which it is 
made in order to become a binding contract, 
and that a conditional acceptance or one 
that varies from the offer in any substan-
tial respect is, in effect, a rejec.tion 
and is the equivalent of a new proposition."2 
b. A counter-offer is by definition an offer; 
and if the original offeror accepts it, a 
binding contract results. 
Patterson and Goble, Cases on Contracts, Foundation Press, 
Inc., Brooklyn, 1949, p. 99-.-
2Morse v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139; 140 N.E. 803. 
" 
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c. B offers his car to C for $450.00. C_says, 
"I will take it at that price if you agree 
to paint it first." This is a modified 
acceptance and thus a counter-offer. It 
destroys the first offer and creates a new 
one. 
d. If the offeree rejects the offer, the offer 
is terminated. A counter-offer is a rejec-
tion. The offeree thereafter cannot revive 
the offer by attempting to accept it. It 
may be that the offeror will be willing to 
renew the offer; but unless he does so, 
there is no offer for the offeree to accept. 1 
14. When the offeree merely seeks information in order 
to ascertain the exact nature and scope of the 
offer, or makes suggestions as to the methods by 
which the contract may be consummated, such com-
munications are not construed to be a counter-
offer, and the offeror's proposal remains capable 
of being accepted. 
a. "Frequently an offeree, while making a posi-
tive acceptance of the offer, adds as a re-
quest or suggestion that some addition or 
modification be made. So long as it is 
clear that the meaning of the acceptance 
is positively and unequivocally to accept 
the offer, whether such request is granted 
or not, a contract is formed."2 
b. B offers to sell his car to C for $450.00. 
C asks "Does that include the snow tires 
which you used last winter?:" A question is 
being asked and not a condition imposed. 
This offer remains capable of being accepted. 
1J. E. Watkins Co. v. Stewart, 220 Ala. 43; 124 So. 86. 
2Nelson v. Hamlin, 258 Mass. 331; 155 N.E. 18. 
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15 •. The capacity to accept comes to an end upon 
termination of the offer. If the offeree attempts 
to accept the offer after it has been terminated, 
his act is meaningless unless the original of-
feror is willing to regard the late acceptance 
as a new offer which he may then accept. 
E. Methods of Termination of Offer 
1. An offer not under seal, and for which no con-
sideration is given to keep it open, may be re-
voked by the offeror at any time before it is 
accepted. An offer to sell property is revoked 
if, before acceptance, the property is sold to 
another with the knowledge of the offeree. 
a. A published offer to run trains may be re-
voked, but the revoking advertisement must 
be as extensive as the offer.l 
b. No particular form of words is required to 
constitute a revocation. Any expression 
indicating that the offer is revoked is 
sufficient. 
c. Revocation of an offer is ordinarily effec-
tive only when it has been communicated to 
the offeree. 
d. If the offeree is depositing his acceptance 
in the mail at the very moment that the 
offeror is mailing a revocation of the 
offer, a valid contract will, nevertheless, 
result. Acceptance takes effect when it 
begins its journey to the offeror. Revo-
cation is not effective until communicated 
to the offeree. 
1scars v. Eastern Ry. Co., 14 Allen (Mass.) 433; 92 Am. Dec. 
780. 
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e. If the offeree has paid or has given some 
consideration for the privilege of having 
the offer remain open a specific length of 
time, the offeror may not revoke during 
this period. This arrangement is termed 
an "option." In all other instances, the 
offeror may withdraw his offer at any time 
before acceptance takes place. 
2. If the offeror does not specify the duration of 
the offer, it is said to remain open for a rea-
sonable time. The law defines a "reasonable 
time" in terms of the circumstances and subject 
matter of each, as illustrated in the following 
examples: 
a. Where perishable goods are involved, a 
delay in accepting an offer to sell in ex-
cess of a day or two could be considered 
to be unreasonable. This offer would lapse 
within a relatively brief time. 
b. An offer to sell a farm tractor could be 
held to be in existence for several weeks 
or possibly longer, since deterioration of 
the subject matter is not likely to take 
place in a short time. 
3. If either party to the contract dies or becomes 
insane before acceptance of the offer, the offer 
automatically terminates. 1 ThiS is true even 
though the other party has no notice of the 
death or insanity. 
a. A agreed with B to guarantee the payment 
for all goods which B should sell to C, 
until A should notify B to the contrary. 
1Am. Chain Co. v. Arrow Grip Mfg. Co., 134 Ndsc. 321; 235 
N.Y.S. 288. 
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A died and thereafter, B sold goods to C, 
in ignorance of A's death. It was held 
that A's estate was not liable on the 
guaranty. The court was of the opinion 
that the death of the guarantor operated 
as a revocation of the agreement.! 
b. "The insanity must have entered into and 
induced the particular contract or convey-
ance; it must appear that it was not the 
act of the free and untrammeled mind."2 
4. An offer to perform an illegal act has no con-
sequence and may not be accepted. If the per-
formance of the contract becomes illegal after 
the offer is made, the offer is terminated. 
Thus, if an offer is made to sell alcoholic 
liquors, but a law is enacted prohibiting such 
sales before the offer is accepted, the offer 
is terminated. Neither party may sue for dam-
ages in such a situation. 
5. The other two methods by which an offer may be 
terminated have been discussed previously in 
other contexts: 
a. Rejection of offer by offeree 
b. Counter-offer by offeree 
1Jordan v. Dobbins, 122 Mass. 168; 23 Am. Rep. 305. 
2Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6; 55 N.W. 276. 
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III. Genuineness of Assent 
A. Mistakes 
1. A mistake exists when a person, under some erro-
neous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits 
to do, some act which, but for the erroneous 
conviction, he would not have done or omitted.1 
It may arise either from unconsciousness, igno-
rance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced 
confidence. 2 
2. Mistakes may be classified in law as either a 
mistake of fact or as a mistake of law. They 
are defined as follows: 
a. A mistake of fact is a mistake not caused 
by the neglect of a legal duty on the part 
of the person making the mistake, and con-
sisting in an unconscious ignorance or 
forgetfulness or a fact, p~st or present, 
material to the contract.} 
b. A mistake of law happens when a party, 
having full knowledge of the facts, comes 
to an erroneous conclusion as to their 
legal effect.4 
3. Mistakes may also be classified as either uni-
lateral or bilateral. 
1ward v. Lyman, 108 Vt. 464; 388 A. 892, 896. 
2calasar v. Steelman, 22 Cal. App. 2d 402; 71 P. 2d 79, 82. 
3callan Court Co., Inc. v. Citizens' & Southern Nat. Bank, 
184 Ga. 87; 190 S.E. 831, 854. 
4 Barnett v. Douglas, 102 Cal. 85; 226 P. 1035, 1037. 
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a. A unilateral mistake is a mistake or mis-
understanding as to the terms or effect of 
a contract, made or entertained by one of 
the parties to it but not by the other.l 
A unilateral mistake does not ordinarily 
excuse the mistaken party from performance 
under the contract. 
b. The following are examples of unilateral 
mistakes which do not justify nonperfor-
mance: 
(1) A purchasing a new car without realiz-
ing that it will not fit into his 
garage. 
(2) A entering into a partnership with B, 
ignorant of the legal consequences of 
this relationship. 
c. In rare instances, a court of equity may 
grant relief in the case of a unilateral 
mistake to the mistaken party, where a 
failure to do so would result in extreme 
hardship. 
d. Where only one of the parties is mistaken, 
but the other is aware, or ought reasonably 
to have been aware of the mistake, the 
resulting contract is invalid. 
e. A mutual mistake exists where the parties 
have a common intention, but it is induced 
by a common or mutual mistake.2 In this 
situation, there is no contract since the 
parties never agreed to the same thing. 
f. Bilateral mistakes with respect to expecta-
tions have no effect unless the realization 
of these expectations is made a provision 
of the contract. 
4. A contract is void if there is a mutual mistake 
as to the existence of the subject matter. 
1Greene v. Stone, 54 N.J. Eq. 387; 34 A. 1099. 
2Paine-Fishburn Granite Co. v. Reynoldson, 115 Neb. 520; 213 N.w. 750; 751. 
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Thus, where A contracts to sell his car to B 
but the car has been destroyed by fire an hour 
previously, and this fact is not known by either 
party, no contract results. 1 
5. A contract is void if there is a mutual mistake 
as to the identity of the subject matter of the 
contract. This is illustrated as follows: 
a. P, a broker, understood that he was author-
ized by D to find a buyer for D's stock in 
a corporation in which D owned all the 
stock, but D understood that he was author-
izing P to sell the physical plant owned 
by the corporation. P found a buyer for 
the stock. It was held that there was no 
contract due to the mutual mistake as to 
the identity of the subject matter of the 
contract.2 
b. At an auction sale, D bid for tow, believing 
the article for sale was hemp. Both arti-
cles were in view. The jury found that the 
auctioneer intended to sell tow and the 
bidder intended to buy hemp. It was held 
that there was no contract.? 
6. There is marked disagreement among the states as 
to the effect of a mistake concerning the iden-
tity of the parties. 
a. In the situation where the parties deal face 
to face, a majority of the courts feel that 
1Jeselsohn v. Park Trust Co., 241 Mass. 388; 135 N.E. 315. 
2Rexford v. Phillipi, 337 No. 389; 84 S.W.2d 628. 
?scriven v. Hindley, 3 K.B. 564. 
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the contract should not be affected by the 
fact that one party was mistaken as to the 
identity of the other.l 
b. The majority view comes to this conclusion 
only where the mistake is not2caused by the fraud of the other party. 
c. A minority of the courts, including Massa-
chusetts, distinguish where the parties 
are not dealing face to face, but rather 
"at arms length" such as by mail. 
d. The minority view is based upon the premise 
that where the parties deal face to face, 
they intend to deal, each, with the person 
in front of him, regardless of the name by 
which he may be called, while no such 
assumption may be drawn when the parties 
deal at arms length. 
B. Misrepresentation 
1. A misrepresentation is any manifestation by words 
or other conduct by one person to another that, 
under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion 
not in accordance with the facts.3 
2. Generally speaking, misrepresentation, as dis-
tinguished from fraud, involves an innocent mis-
statement of fact. 
3. Where the misrepresentation is innocent and is 
of an inconsequential nature, the tendency is 
1Ludwinska v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 577; 
178 A. 28. 
2school Sisters of Notre Dame v. Eusnitt, 125 Md. 323; 93 A. 
928. 
3 . A. P. Landis, Inc. v. Mellinger, 116 Pa. Super. 167; 175 A. 
745, 746. ' 
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in most states to enforce the contract, less 
whatever minor damages are sustained by the 
misrepresented party. Assume A offered to sell 
B a bag which A claimed contained one hundred 
potatoes and that B accepted A's offer at a 
mutually agreed price. Actually, there were only 
ninety-nine potatoes, the result of an innocent 
miscount by A. Most courts would enforce this 
agreement, deducting the cost of one potato. 
4. Even though innocent, a misrepresentation which 
goes to the heart of the contract, a material 
misrepresentation, is fatal to the existence of 
the contract. Assume that A honestly believes 
his statement to B that a certain diamond offered 
for sale by A is genuine. If this assertion 
proves untrue, the agreement will not be enforced 
since the misrepresentation goes to the very 
core of the contract. 
5. A contract which results through an intentional 
misrepresentation is voidable at the election 
of the injured party. In such instance, it 
makes no difference whether the misrepresenta-
tion is inconsequential or material. 
c. Concealment 
1. Concealment refers to a withholding of something 
which one knows, and which one, in duty, is 
bound to reveal. 1 
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2. Where A and B stand in a confidential relation-
ship, as trust beneficiary and trustee, or attor-
ney and client, B has a duty to reveal anything 
that is to A's interests. A failure to do so 
is considered tantamount to fraud, and A may 
have the contract set aside if he so elects. 
3. Other than in the case where a confidential 
relationship exists, there are relatively few 
situations when the law requires contracting 
parties to volunteer information. 
4. While in a contract of sale, the general rule 
is "caveat emptor,"2 there is one important 
exception recognized by most states including 
Massachusetts. A seller must disclose to a pro-
spective buyer defects in the property provided 
they are known by the seller and provided also, 
that a reasonable inspection of the property by 
the buyer would not have revealed these defects. 
The issue of whether or not a reasonable inspec-
tion was made is a question of fact for the jury. 
1strauss v. Dubuque ~ire & Marine Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 
283; 22 A2d 582. 
2Latin phrase: "Let the buyer beware!" 
Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108; 3 S.Ct. 
See: Kellogg Bridge 
537. 
' 
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D. Fraud 
1. "Fraud consists of some deceitful practice or 1 
willful device, resorted to with intent to de-
prive another of his right, or in some manner 
to do him an injury. As distinguished from 
negligenqe, it is always positive and intentional."1 
2. "It is an intentional perversion of the truth 
for the purpose of inducing another, in reliance 
upon it, to part with some valuable thing belong-
ing to him or to surrender a legal right."2 
3. "To recover in an action of deceit (fraud), the 
plaintiff must prove, concerning the misrepre-
sentation, that it was as to a matter of fact, 
which may include a belief or an intention, made 
by the defendant or his agent; that it was made 
with the intention to induce another to act upon 
it; that it was made with knowledge of its un-
truth, or was made of a fact susceptible of 
actual knowledge with recklessness as to its 
truth or falsehood, or was the utterance of a 
half truth which in effect is a lie, or was the 
failure to disclose known facts when there was 
a duty, original or supervening; that it was 
1
studer v. Bleinstein, 115 N.Y. 316; 22 N.E. 243. 
2Brainerd Dispatch Newspaper Co. v. Crow Wing County, 196 
Minn. 194; 246 N.w. 779, 780. 
intended that it.should be relied upon, as it 
was, and that damage directly resulted there-
from.111 
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4. "The test to be applied to determine whether 
the defendant is to be relieved of its contract 
by reason of any alleged fraudulent misrepresen-
tations is the same as that applied in actions 
for tort for deceit. 112 
5. To constitute a misrepresentation, the statement 
must be one of fact as distinguished from a pro-
mise or a prophecy. 
a. D sold a bond to P representing it to be an 
"A No. 1 bond" and that the property was 
"good security." It was held that this was 
more opinion or judgment and not actionable. 
"It is settled that the law does not exact 
good faith from a seller in those vague 
commendations of his wares which manifestly 
are open to differences of opinion, which 
do not imply untrue assertions concerning 
matters of direct observation •••• and as to 
which it always has been understood, the 
world over, that such statements are to be 
distrusted."3 
b. A false statement made by a third person, 
as to what the vendor paid for the thing 
sold is not "dealers' talk," and such per4 son is liable to the plaintiff in deceit. 
1Alpine v. Friend Bros., Inc., 244 Mass. 164; 138 N.E. 553. 
2Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 305 Mass. 362; 25 N.E.2d 740. 
3Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504; 20 N.E. 107. 
4Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 246; 39 Am. Dec. 726. 
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6. D and E were officers of a corporation organized 
under the laws of Maine. As required by law, a 
certificate had been filed in Massachusetts with 
the Commissioner of Corporations, which certifi-
cate contained materially false statements. P 
had an attorney investigate the records, and 
relying on the statements in the certificate, 
bought shares and.was damaged. It was held he 
could not recover; the misrepresentation was 
not made to him or to influence him. 1 
7. P purchased stock upon a fraudulent representa-
tion that it was treasury stock. It was D's own 
stock. All the stock, however, was worthless. 
It was held that P could not recover against D 
for this fraud. Although it is immaterial in 
many states, a plaintiff must be able to show 
damages to recover for deceit or fraud in 
Massachusetts. No damage sustained here. 2 
E. Undue Influence 
1. Undue influence is defined as any improper or 
wrongful constraint, machination, or urgency of 
persuasion whereby the will of a person is over-
powered. 
1Hunnewell v. Dunbury, 154 Mass. 286; 28 N.E. 267. 
2Goodwin v. Dick, 220 Mass. 556; 107 N.E. 925. 
2. It is influence which destroys freedom of a 
person's will and renders it more the will of 
another than his own. 
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3. Generally, undue influence is limited to situa-
tions where a confidential relationship exists. 
4. Overbearing persuasion and argument are the 
essence of undue influence rather than threats 
of violence. 
F. Duress 
1. Duress is said to exist if a threat of physical 
harm or violence induces a person to act in a 
given manner. 
2. The difference between undue influence and duress 
is in degree rather than kind. 
3. Duress may include threats and be directed to 
third persons who are near relatives of the 
intimidated person making the contract. 
4. Generally, a threat of economic loss is not 
considered duress. 
G. Remedies 
1. The effect of fraud, undue influence, and duress 
is to make the contract either voidable or void. 
2. If the contract is voidable, it may be set aside 
by the injured party only. 
3. If the injured party does not elect to avoid the 
4-1 
contract, it becomes a valid agreement. 
4-. If the contract is void, no party has any rights 
under it. 
5. The right to rescind the contract is lost if the 
injured party, with full knowledge of the facts, 
affirms the transaction, or fails to object with-
in a reasonable time. 
6. If the injured party has the right to rescind, 
he has the right to recover anything that he has 
paid or given the other party in performance of 
the contract. 
7. The right to rescind the contract is lost by any 
conduct that is inconsistent with an intention 
to avoid it. 
8. "One who seeks to avoid a contract because of 
duress must return what she has received under 
the contract. She cannot successfully contend 
that the contract is void, so as to be relieved 
of its obligations, and valid in order to enjoy 
its benefits."1 
9. When the result of a mutual mistake is merely 
that a writing does not correctly state the 
agreement made by the parties, either party will 
be able to have the court correct or reform the 
1Webb v. Lothrop, 224- Mass. 103; 112 N.E. 934-. 
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contract to express the intended meaning. 1 
IV. Consideration 
A. Definition 
1. "Consideration is the cause, motive, price, or 
impelling influence which induces a contracting 
party to enter into a contract."2 
2. "Consideration is the giving up or agreement to 
give up a legal right."3 
3. In simplest terms, consideration is what a 
' promisor is willing to accept in return for his 
promise. 
B. Basic Concepts of Consideration 
1. Consideration is a necessary element in the 
formation of every contract. A promise unsup-
ported by consideration is termed in law a "naked 
promise" and is incapable of being enforced. 
2. "It is enough that the consideration be valuable, 
it need not be adequate. 114 
a. A valuable consideration is one recognized 
or permitted by the law as valid and lawful. 
1Kear v. Hausmann, 152 Neb. 512; 41 N.W.2d. 850. 
2cassinelli v. Stacy, 238 Ky. 827; 38 S.W.2d 980, 983. 
3 H. H. Brown Shoe Co., v. H. C. Brown Co., 258 Mass. 343; 155 
N.E. 22. 
4Barnett v. Rosen, 235 Mass. 244; 126 N.E. 386. 
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b. A said to B, "I want you to attend my funer-
al, B, if you outlive me, and I think you 
will, and I will pay all expenses and I will 
give you #500.00. I want you to come." 
B promised he would do so and he did attend 
A's funeral, and sued A's executor for the 
$500.00. It was held that B could recover. 
Since the consideration was "valuable" in 
the first place, the court will not go into 
the question of whether or not A "struck 
a good bargain."l 
c. Generally, love and affection are considered 
in law as "good consideration," as distin-
guished from "valuable consideration," and 
hence insufficient to support a contract. 
Legally, love and affection are not things 
of value. 
3. Consideration may not be what one is already 
legally required to do or what one is legally 
required to refrain from doing. The following 
are examples: 
a. A promise not to drive in excess of the 
speed limit is not valid consideration. 
b. A watchman of the city, in the performance 
of his duty, detected one in the act of 
setting fire to a building and claimed the 
reward offered. It was held that the pro-
mise, as to the plaintiff, was without 
consideration.2 
C. Forbearance and Compromise 
1. Mere forbearance does not constitute considera-
tion. The forbearance or the promise to forbear 
must be requested by the promisor as the price 
1Earle v. Angell, 157 Mass. 294; 32 N.E. 164. 
2Pool v. City of Boston 5 Gush. (Mass.) 219. 
2. 
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of his promise. 
a. "It is the established·law in this Common-
wealth that mere forbearance without agree-
ment is not enough to support a new promise; 
and that neither a promise to do, nor the 
doing of merely what the debtor already is 
bound to do, is a sufficient consideration 
for such an agreement."l 
b. A promise to pay B the sum of $1,000 if he 
will give up smoking (or refrain from smo-
king) for one year may be enforced. In 
this instance, B is refraining from doing 
something which he has a legal right to do. 
c. "A promise to refrain from bringing a civil 
suit is considered to be valid consideration. 
If an intending litigant 'bona fide' for-
bears a right to litigate, he does give up 
something of value. n2 . 
Forbearance as consideration often appears in 
cases of compromises, wherein one party gives up 
certain rights against another in exchange for 
payment of a sum of money. 
3. In many settlement situations, the courts follow 
two distinct rules in determining whether the 
compromise made is a bar to a suit for the 
balance claimed. These rules may be illustrated 
as follows: 
a. Assume B owes A an undisputed sum of $100.00. 
A accepts $50.00 as settlement in full and 
promises not to bring suit for the balance. 
B pays but subsequently A does bring suit 
1Barber v. Rathvon, 250 Mass. 479; 145 N.E. 866. 
2Kennedy v. Welch, 196 Mass. 592; 83 N.E. 11. 
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for the remainder. A will win on the 
grounds that his prior promise to accept 
less than the true amount due was not sup-
ported by consideration. No matter what B 
did, A would always be sure of a court judgment in the full amount. 
b. Assume that there is a legitimate dispute 
between the parties as to what, if anything, 
B owes A. Now Assume A makes the same pro-
mise as before. This agreement bars any 
further recovery by A. The courts find 
consideration in this situation on the 
grounds that the results of an original 
suit by A are speculative. B might have 
been able to prove he owed A nothing. Faced 
with the possibility of a negative finding 
in court, A's agreement represents a bind-
ing compromise which is supported by valid 
consideration. 
c. The ,deciding factor, then, in these situa-
tions, is the presence or absence of a bona 
fide dispute between the parties concerning 
the debt in question. 
D. Past Consideration 
1. As to time, considerations may be of' the past, 
present, or future. Those which are present or 
future will support a contract not void for 
other reasons. 
2. It is universally held that past consideration 
is no consideration and may not, of itself, 
support a contractual agreement. 
a. When one person performs some serYice for 
another without the latter's knowledge or 
without an understanding that compensation 
will be paid, a promise made later to pay 
for such services, is not supported by 
consideration and is unenforceable.l 
Stonebur~er v. Motley, 95 Va. 784; 30 S.E. 364. 
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b. The adult son of D, on return from a sea 
voyage, became sick and P cared for him. 
Afterward, D promised to pay P for hi~ 
expenses. P sued to recover. It was held 
that he could not do so. The acts of P 
were not done in reliance. upon any promise 
made by D. 1Past consideration is no con-sideration. 
3. There are a few exceptions to the general rule. 
Some courts hold that when benefits are derived 
by fraud or under other circumstances that cre-
ate a moral obligation, a subsequent promise to 
pay is enforceable. However, decisions of this 
nature are relatively rare. 2 
E. Adequacy of Consi'deration 
1. As has been pointed out, the law generally ig-
" nores the adequacy of the consideration once it 
has been determined that what is being exchanged 
is of some value. 
2. The view adopted by our courts is consistent 
with the underlying philosophy of our economy, 
in which each individual is allowed to bargain 
freely and to determine the exact nature of his 
contractual obligations. 
3. The rule that the courts will not interfere to 
make sure that each party is getting a "fair 
1Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 207. 
2Lupinski v. Fischer, 255 Wis. 182; N.W.2d 429. 
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return" is subject to certain exceptions. 
a. An agreement contemplating the exchange of 
different quantities of identical units 
will not be enforced. An example would be 
in the instance where A agrees to give B 
fifty dollars and B agrees to give A sixty 
dollars simultaneously and where only United 
States currency is involved. 
b. The courts will look into the adequacy of 
the consideration where there is evidence 
of fraud. 
F. Mutuality of Obligation 
1. Both parties to a contract must be obligated in 
some way. If a person can make a promise and 
still exercise the same freedom he had before 
he made the promise, there is no consideration 
for the return promise and, thus, no contract. 
2. Promises which appear to assure something of 
value, but which really do not embody such assur-
ance, are "illusory promises," because real 
mutuality is lacking. 
a. A promises to buy from Bas many of B's 
eggs as he (A) should wish at fifty cents 
a dozen. A has not really agreed to buy 
any of the eggs, but has promised to buy 
only in case he should want them, which is 
equivalent to no promise at all. Since A 
has given B no consideration for his pro-
mise, his promise is illusory and B may 
withdraw from the agreement. 
b. An agreement by A to buy "all of his require-
ments" from B at fifty cents a dozen is 
valid. B must sell at the given price and 
A may not buy from another source. 
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c. The exception to the doctrine of mutuality 
lies in the area of voidable contracts to 
be discussed at a later point in this paper. 
G. Exceptions to the Requirements of Consideration 
1. Voluntary subscriptions to charity, although 
lacking in consideration, are generally enforced. 
The courts consider such promises binding as a 
matter of public policy. 
2. It is not necessary to allege consideration in 
the case of a sealed instrument. Consideration, 
in such a case, is presumed to exist. 
3. No consideration is necessary to support an 
obligation or contract of record, such as a 
judgment of a court or a recognizance. It would 
be contrary to public policy to permit obliga-
tions, formally entered into a court record, to 
be questioned. 
4. When a negotiable instrument, such as a check or 
promissory note has been executed and delivered, 
consideration is presumed to exist. This pre-
sumption, however, may be rebutted as between 
the immediate parties. Lack or failure of con-
sideration is no defense against certain other 
persons holding a negotiable instrument. 
5. Some courts also enforce promises that are not 
supported by consideration upon a theory called 
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"promissory estoppel." By this doctrine if the 
promisee substantially changes his position 
relying on the promise, the promisor is barred 
from setting up the absence of consideration in 
order to avoid his promise. Application of the 
doctrine is normally confined to those situa-
tions where great injustice may only be avoided 
by enforcement of the promise. The doctrine of 
promissory estoppel has been accepted in only a 
few states and has been expressly rejected in 
Massachusetts. 
v. Legality of Contracts 
A. Effect of Illegal Contracts 
1. A contract is illegal when, under the common 
law or under statute, either the formation or 
the performance of the agreement is deemed a 
crime or a tort, or is opposed to public policy. 
a. A crime is a positive or negative act in 
violation of the penal law. In present 
usage, the term is commonly applied to 
grave offenses against the law of the 
state.l Since it is a wrong against soci-
ety at large, criminal complaints are 
brought in the name of the state rather 
than the names of individuals. 
b. A tort is a private or civil wrong. 
a wrong of less serious consequence 
crime in which the person harmed is 
It is 
than a 
allowed 
1
van Riper v. Constitutional Govt. League, 1 Wash. 2d 635; 
96 P.2d 588, 591. 
" 
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to bring suit in his own name. It is not 
sufficiently grave to be considered a vio-
lation against society as a whole, Whereas 
punishment for a crime may involve death, 
imprisonment, or fine, punishment in the 
case of a tort is limited to the award of 
money damages to the injured party, 
c. "Public policy is that principle of law 
which holds that no subject can lawfully 
do that which has a tendency to be injurious 
to the public or against the public good."l 
(1) An agreement that if the plaintiff 
(2) 
would vote for the defendant as pres-
ident of a corporation, and increase 
his salary $500,00, the plaintiff 
would be paid $3~0.00 by the defend-
ant, is illegal, 
D entered into a composition of cred-
itors to pay them a certain per cent. 
P signed the agreement but arranged 
to get all that was due him. The 
creditors were paid, and P sued for 
the balance due him. It was held 
that the further agreement with P 
was void, and he could not recover,3 
2. If a contract is illegal, it is generally held 
that neither party may sue the other to obtain 
performance or damages. No party may seek the 
aid of a judicial tribunal who does not enter 
court with "clean hands."4 However, the "clean 
1council v. Cohe~, 303 Mass. 348; 21 N.E.2d 967. 
2woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309. 
3Brown v. Realley, 161 Mass.l;:l36 N.E. 464. 
4Eresch v. Braecklein, C,C,A. Kan., 133 F.2d 12, 14, 
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hands" doctrine is inapplicable where to with-
hold relief would offend public morals more than 
to grant relief. 1 
3. Normally, while an illegal contract remains 
executory, either party may disaffirm it and 
recover money or property advanced under it. 2 
If the contract has been executed, the court 
will not relieve either party from the conse-
quences of his own violation of law. 
4. Where an agreement involves the performance of 
several promises, some of which are legal and 
some illegal, the legal part of the agreement 
may be enforced provided it is capable of being 
separated from the part which is illegal. The 
same rule applies when the consideration is 
illegal in part. The following are examples: 
a. If A offered B $5,000 for B's drug store 
and an additional $2,000 for the fraudulent 
transfer of a narcotics license, it would 
be possible to weed out the illegal elements 
and enforce the remainder of the contract. 
b. If A offered B $7,000 for the drug store 
and the fraudulent transfer of a narcotics 
license, the entire contract would fall 
since it would be impossible to determine 
how~uch of the consideration was to be 
allocated to each part of the contract. 
Furman v. Furman, 34 N.Y.S.2d 699; 178 Misc. 582. 
2Eastern Expanded Metal Co. v. Webb Granite & Const. 195 
Mass. 356; 81 N.E. 251. 
Foston Univer~itY 
Scho0 l of Educ~tioU 
L'ibrJ!.r~ 
B. Contracts Injuring Public Service 
1. Any contract that tends to interfere with the 
proper performance of the duties of a public 
officer, whether legislative, administrative, 
or judicial, is contrary to public policy and 
void. 
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2. One of the more common examples of this classi-
fication is the so-called "lobbying contract." 
a. This term is ordinarily used to describe a 
contract by which one party agrees to use 
bribery, or threat of loss of votes, or 
other improper means to procure or prevent 
the adoption of particular legislation by 
a lawmaking body, such as Congress or a 
state legislature. 
b. A contract to secure the passage of legis-
lation by any other means than the use of 
reason and presentation of facts, making 
arguments and submitting them orally or 
in writing is a lobbying contract.l 
c. Lobbying contracts are universally held to 
be illegal and void. 
c. Contracts Obstructing Legal Process 
1. "Any act by which one or more persons attempt to 
prevent, or do prevent, the execution of lawful 
process is void. The term applies also to ob-
structing the administration of justice in any 
way, as by hindering witnesses from appearing 
in court."2 
1Ewing v. National Airport Corporation, C.C.A., Va. 115 F.2d 
859, 860, 861. 
2Melton v. Commonwealth, 160 Ey. 642; 170 s.w. 37. 
2. Contracts that promise to pay money in return 
for the abandonment of the prosecution of a 
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criminal case, or for the suppression of evidence 
in any legal action are void. 
D. Usury 
1. Usury involves an illegal contract for a loan or 
forbearance of money, goods, or things in action, 
by which illegal interest is reserved, or agreed 
to be reserved, or taken. 1 
2. "A profit greater than the lawful rate of inter-
est, intentionally exacted as a bonus is con-
sidered usury,n2 
3. When there is an agreement for interest but no 
rate is specified, or when the law implies a 
duty to pay interest, as on judgments, the "legal 
rate" is applied. The legal rate in most states, 
including Massachusetts, is six per cent. 
4. All states except Montana, North Dakota, Arkansas, 
Georgia, and South Carolina have adopted so-called 
"Small Loan Laws," the essential purpose of which 
is to regulate the consumer finance business.3 
!Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Lorentz, 209 Minn. 278; 296 N.W. 
911. 
2Anderson v. Beedle, 35 N W 6~Jt 5 P 2d 528 529 • • /T; • ' • 
3For a comprehensive summary of the Small Loan Laws in the 
United States, See: Small Loan Laws, Educational Pamphlet 
No, 2; Bureau of Bus~ness Research, Western Reserve Uni-
versivy; copyright 1955. 
Massachusetts was the first state to enact a 
law of the type now commonly enforced. 
E. Wagers and Lotteries 
1. "A wager is an agreement by which two or more 
parties agree that a certain sum of money or 
other thing shall be paid or delivered to one 
of them, or that they shall gain or lose on the 
happening of an uncertain event, or upon the 
ascertainment of a fact in dispute, where the 
parties have no interest in the event except 
that arising from the possibility of such gain 
or loss. 1 
2. A lottery is defined to be a device whereby 
anything of value is, for a consideration, 
awarded by lot or chance. 2 "To constitute a 
'lottery,' there must be a prize, a chance, and 
a price,"3 
3, Wagers and lotteries are generally held to be 
illegal. Raffles are usually regarded as lot-
teries.4 
1Young v. Stephenson, 82 Cal, 239; 200 P. 225, 228, 
2
state. of inf. McKittrich v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 
341 No. 862; 110 S.W.2d 705. 
3state v. Doreau, 124 Conn. 160; 198 A. 573. 
4 Horner v. U.S., 147 U.S, 449; 37 L.Ed, 237. 
4. Wagers and insurance are distinguished on the 
ground that the latter requires an insurable 
interest. 
F. Exchange Future Transactions 
1. A person may legally buy or sell goods for 
future delivery. 
2. It is not necessary that the seller actually 
own the goods at the time the contract is en-
tered into. 
3. The seller in such a case is speculating on a 
decline in the market price. If the price 
should increase, he would incur a loss. 
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4. If, however, there is no intention that delivery 
should be made, but merely that one party should 
pay the other the difference between the con-
tract price and the market price on the date 
set for delivery, the transaction is merely a 
gambling contract or a wager upon the future 
market price, and the contract is deemed illegal 
and void. 
5. "Whoever upon credit or upon margin contracts 
to buy or sell, or employs another to buy or 
sell for his account, a~y securities or commod-
ities, intending at the time that there shall 
be no actual purchase or sale, may recover in 
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contract from the other party to the contract, 
or from the person so employed, any payment 
made, or the value of anything delivered, on 
account thereof, if such other party to the 
contract or person so employed had reasonable 
nl 
cause to believe that said intention existed •••• 
G. Sunday Contracts 
1. The general rule is that contracts made on 
Sunday are not enforceable.2 
2. If a contract is made on Sunday for the sale of 
goods which are delivered on a weekday, while 
the contract cannot be enforced, the vendor can 
recover on a quasi contract for the fair value 
of the goods. 
3. " •••• however, this well-established doctrine is 
not to be invoked against an innocent purchaser 
for value without notice of the previous illegal 
transaction."3 
H. Licensed Callings or Dealings 
1. Statutes frequently require that a person pro-
cure a license, certificate, or diploma before 
Massachusetts General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 137, sec. 4. 
2Hindenland v. Mahon, 225 Mass. 445; 114 N.E. 684. 
3Mann v. United Motor Boston Co., 226 Mass. 495; 116 N.E. 239. 
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he may enter upon certain callings or practice 
most professions. 
2. A failure to hold a required license or certi-
ficate may or may not bar an individual from 
recovery for services rendered, under contract. 
This is explained as follows: 
a. If the primary purpose of the regulation 
requiring a license is further revenue for 
the state, a failure to hold that license 
will not deprive an individual from recover-
ing for services rendered under a contract. 
An example would be in the instance where 
A agrees to collect B's garbage for one 
year and B agrees to pay A $50.00 but re-
fuses to do so when he discovers that A 
does not have a license required of all 
garbage collectors. A will be allowed to 
recover, This license is a revenue mea-
sure only, 
b, If the primary purpose of the regulation 
requiring a license is the protection of 
the public health, welfare, or morals, a 
failure to hold that license will bar an 
individual from recovering for any service 
rendered under a contract, An example 
would be in the instance where A represents 
himself to be a doctor and treats B. If 
this representation is false, A will not 
be able to recover even though his work 
was of a professional calibre. This li-
cense is required primarily in order to 
protect the public health. 
c. In either case, failure to hold the re-
quired license could result in imprison-
ment or fine by the state. 
I. Fraudulent Sales 
1. Statutes commonly regulate the sale of certain 
goods and commodities. 
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2. In certain instances, weights and measurements 
must be periodically checked by des~gnated 
authorities. 
3. Certain articles must be inspected or labeled 
in a required manner before they may be sold 
by the manufacturer to the public. 
4. Since the laws are generally designed for the 
protection of the public, it is usually held 
that transactions in violation of such laws are 
void. 
5. When the purpose of the law is merely to raise 
revenue by the requirement of a fee, the viola-
tion makes the wrongdoer liable for the penalty 
imposed by law but does not make the transaction 
void. 
6. The fact that a fee must be paid under a parti-
cular statute does not by itself determine that 
the statute is a revenue measure. The fee may 
be imposed to defray the expenses of administra-
tion. 
J. Contracts in Restraint of Trade 
1. In the federal courts, contracts in restraint 
of trade are defined as "contracts or combina-
tions which tend or are designed to eliminate 
or stifle competition, effect a monopoly, arti-
1 
ficially maintain prices, or otherwise hamper 
or obstruct the course of trade and commerce 
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as it would be carried on if left to the centro] 
of natural and economic forces." 1 
2. In addition to the illegality of the contract 
based on general principles of law, statutes 
frequently declare monopolies illegal and sub-
ject the parties to such agreements to various 
civil and criminal punishments. 2 
3. In the state courts, the most common issue de-
cided with reference to contracts in restraint 
of trade involves the legality of general re-
straints of individuals in their trades and 
professions. 
a. "Formerly it seems to have been held that 
a provision for a general restraint of any 
person in his trade was necessarily invalid. 
But in this Commonwealth and in other juris-
dictions, this is no longer the law. 11 3 
b. "In connection with the sale of the good 
will of a business, the vendor will be 
bound by any covenant which is reasonably 
necessary for the preservation and protec-
tion of the property which he sells."4 
U.S. v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26; 40 S.Ct. 425, 429. 
U.S. v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525; 33 S.Ct. 141, 144, 145. 
2Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A., Sees. 1-7; Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C.A., Sees. 12-27; Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
u.s.c.A., Sees. 41-41. 
3united Shoe Machinery Co. v. Kimball, 193 Mass. 351. 
4Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkee, 171 Mass. 101; 50 N.E. 509. 
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(1) Where A sells a going business such 
as a barber shop to B, an agreement 
by A not to compete by opening up a 
similar establishment for three years 
within a radius of two miles would 
be enforced as being a reasonable 
restraint. 
(2) In the previous illustration, an 
agreement by A not to compete for 
twenty years within a radius of one 
hundred miles would be struck down 
as unreasonable and therefore invalid. 
c. Where the restraints as to either space or 
time are considered unreasonable, courts 
tend to cut them down to reasonable pro-
portions rather than to ignore the ~revi­
sion entirely. Thus in example "(3)" on 
previous page, the court might arbitrarily 
reduce the restrictions to something re-
sembling those of example "(2)". 
d. Under no circumstances will a court increase 
or elaborate on any such restrictive pro--
v~s~on. It may ease a restriction but never 
increase it. 
4. Under antitrust legislation, an agreement between 
a manufacturer and distributor, or between a 
distributor and a dealer that the latter should 
not resell below a specified minimum price was 
void. 
a. Congress and virtually all states have 
adopted statutes, called "Fair Trade Acts," 
which change this rule and sustain the 
validity of such agreements when they 
relate to trade-marked or brand-named arti-
cles. 
b. The theory of such laws is that it is rea-
sonable and desirable to prevent a party 
from reselling an established article at 
too low a price because such sales may 
harm the reputation or market established 
by the manufacturer of the article. 
c. If the article is not trade-marked or 
brand-named, these "Fair Trade Acts" do 
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not apply, and an agreement against price 
cutting on resale is illegal as a restraint 
on trade in violation of the antitrust laws. 
d. Not only are the parties to the price main-
tenance agreement bound by its terms, but 
anyone having knowledge of the agreement 
who thereafter resells the article under 
its trade name or mark is also required to 
observe the agreement and to maintain the 
price. 
VI. Capacity of Parties · . 
A. General Considerations 
1. While the term "capacity" has many connotations 
in law, it generally refers, in contracts, to 
the legal ability to enter into a binding agree-
ment. 
2. In certain cases, the law does not recognize 
agreements entered into because one or more of 
the parties involved is under a disability 
deemed to be fatal to the right to create a 
contract. 
3. In some instances, although the law permits a 
party to make a contract, it gives him the right 
to avoid it under certain circumstances. 
B. Minors 
1. A minor is an infant or person who is under the 
age of legal competence. An individual is 
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considered to be a minor until midnight of the 
day before his twenty-first birthday. 1 A few 
states hold that a female attains legal adult-
hood upon reaching her eighteenth birthday. A 
few other states hold that a female attains 
majority upon marriage or twenty-one, whichever 
comes first. 
2, With certain exceptions, a contract made by a 
minor is voidable at his election. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
A minor who contracts to do labor may dis-
affirm the contract; if he has performed 
under ~he contract, he may recover fair 
value. 
The fact that the minor misrepresents his 
age does not affect his right to disaffirm.3 
"The general rule is, of course, that in-
fants are liable for their torts but the 
rule is not an unlimited one. It is to be 
applied with due regard to the other equal-
ly well settled rule that, with certain 
exceptions, they are not liable on their 
contracts; and the dominant consideration 
is not that of liability for their torts4 but of protection from their contracts." 
The fact that the minor is married does not 
affect his right to disaffirm his contracts,5 
1Bardwell v. Purrington, 107 Mass. 419. 
2Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 332. 
3Knudson v. Gen. Motorcycle Sales Co. 230 Mass. 54; 119 N.E. 
359. 
4Slayton v. Barry, 175 Mass. 513; 56 N.E. 574. 
5walsh v. Young, 110 Mass. 396. 
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e. P, a minor, had purchased a barge from D 
for $675.00 on account. After P had made 
use of the barge, he notified D of his 
intention to avoid the contract and offered 
to return the barge which D refused to 
accept. D contended that P could not re-
cover the full amount paid but that D was 
entitled to deduct a reasonable compensa-
tion for the use of the barge. It was held 
that P could recover the full amount. "We 
cannot see how the defendants can avail 
themselves of and enforce, by way of recoup-
ment, a claim which they could not enforce 
by a direct suit,nl 
f, The right of a minor to disaffirm a contract 
does not depend on his putting the other 
party in status quo. If it did, he would 
lose in many cases, the protection which 
the law affords him by reason of his minor-
ity.2 
g. "The ground upon which an infant may be 
allowed to avoid his contract is for his 
personal benefit and protection against 
the improvidence which is the consequence 
of his youth, The fact that the infant may 
rescind even if the consideration cannot 
be returned, indicates that the right is 
strictly a personal privilege and he, 
alone, can have the benefit of it,? 
h. Where both parties are minors, each has the 
right to avoid the contract,4 
i. It should be emphasized that the contracts 
of a minor are only voidable as to him, 
never as to any adult involved. 
1McCarthy v. Henderson; 138 Mass. 310, 
2White v. New Bedford Cotton Waste Corp., 178 Mass. 20; 59 
N.E. 642, 
3Glensfield v. Gordon, 144 Mass. 168; 10 N.E. 773. 
4 Drude v. Curtis, 183 Mass. 317; 67 N.E. ?17. 
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3. A minor's contract, whether executed or not, 
can be disaffirmed or avoided by the minor at 
any time during minority, or for a reasonable 
time after becoming of age. What is a reason-
able time is a question of fact for the jury to 
decide in the light of all surrounding circum-
stances. Silence in excess of several weeks 
after majority would indicate a ratification 
in most cases. 
a. "It was not necessary, in order to avoid 
the contract that the plaintiff should 
state that he 'disaffirmed' the contract, 
nor was it necessary for him to say to the 
defendant that he made 'demand' for the 
return of the amount paid. No particular 
words or acts were required. Any acts or 
words showing unequivocally a repudiation 
of the contract are sufficient to avoid 
it."l 
b. When a contract is avoided, it must be 
avoided in all parts. The minor may not 
keep part of the contract and set the re-
mainder aside. 
4. A minor's voidable contract becomes binding upon 
him when he ratifies it. In order to protect 
the minor, ratification is not effective until 
the minor attains his majority. 
a. Ratification may consist of any expression 
that indicates an intention to be bound by 
the contract. 
Tracy v. Brown, 265 Mass. 163; 163 N.E. 885. 
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b. "If, therefore, the minor purchaser, after 
coming of age, retains the specific pro-
perty, treating it as his own, when it is 
in a condition to be restored, and it is 
of any value, and if, for an unreasonable 
time, he neglects to restore it, or to 
tender it, or give notice of his readiness 
to restore it, according to the circum-
stances of the property and of the parties, 
it manifests his determination to keep the 
property and affirm the contract. And 
further; if after coming of age, he retains 
the property for his own use, or sells or 
otherwise disposes of it, such detention, 
use, or disposition which can be conscien-
tiously done only on the assumption that 
the contract of sale was a valid one, is 
evidence of an intention to affirm the 
contract, from which a ratification may be 
inferred."l 
c. An acknowledgment by the minor that a con-
tract had been made during his minority, 
without any indication of an intention to 
be bound thereby, is not a ratification.2 
5. There are several exceptions to the rule that a 
minor's contracts are voidable. 
a. A minor cannot avoid a contract which the 
law specifically requires. If a court 
requires a minor to sign a bond, he must 
do so. Enlistment in the armed forces 
cannot be avoided on the ground of minority. 
A minor is legally required to support his 
wife and minor children. 
b. A few states hold that if a minor is in 
business, his contracts in this connection 
are not voidable.3 The Massachusetts rule 
1Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 519. 
2Hendrich v. Ledes, 17 Colo. 506; 30 P. 245. 
3wickham v. Torley, 136 ~ 594; 71 s.E. 881. 
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is contra. 1 
c. In a few southern states, permission of 
the court may be obtained for a minor to 
execute any given contract. When this per-
mission is obtained and the contract exe-
cuted, it is fully binding on the minor. 
d. The most important exception to the general 
rule concerning minors' contracts is the 
area of necessities. A minor is liable 
for the fair value of necessaries furnished 
to him. "The term 'necessaries' is a 
flexible and not an absolute term, having 
relation to the infant's condition in life, 
to the habits and pursuits occurring in 
the progress of society. What are neces-
saries in one case may not be necessaries 
in another case. As a general rule, food, 
clothing, shelter, medical attention and 
a proper education have been held to come 
within this term. u2 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The minor is liable to pay only what 
the necessities are reasonably worth, 
and not what he may improvidently 
have agreed to pay for them.3 
The services of a lawyer in protect-
ing a minor's property are not neces-
saries and the minor is not liable 
for them.4 
A minor is not bound to pay for 
repairs to his dwelling house.5 
1Ryan v. Smith, 165 Mass. 303; 43 N.E. 109. 
2Moskos v. Marshall, 271 Mass. 302; 171 N.E. 477. 
3Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527; 6 N.E. 761. 
4Mcisaac v. Adams, 190 N~ss. 117; 76 N.E. 654. 
5Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 559; 46 Am. Dec. 704. 
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c. Insane Persons 
1. If a party to a contract is insane, his contracts 
are generally voidable in the same manner as 
those of a minor. 
2. In order to constitute insanity, within the 
meaning of this rule, the party must be so de-
ranged mentally that he does not understand the 
consequences of his acts. The cause of the 
insanity is immaterial. 
3. The insane person's contracts may be avoided 
even though the other party is iBnorant as to 
the incapacity.l 
4. As to conveyances of real estate, the contract 
of the insane person is voidable even against 
an innocent purchaser for value. 
5. There are certain exceptions to the rule that 
an insane person's contracts are voidable. 
a. In most states it is held that where a 
court has appointed a guardian for the 
insane person, any contract made by the 
latter is void, not voidable. 
b. Some states held that if the contract is 
fair and reasonable and is advantageous to 
the incompetent, he may not avoid the agree-
ment where the other party acted without 
knowledge of the insanity and in good faith 
and that it would be impossible to return 
1
sutcliffe v. Heatley, 232 Mass. 231; 122 N.E. 317. 
' 
c. 
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the parties to status quo. 1 
Insane persons are liable for necessaries 
in the same manner as a minor. If sanity 
is restored, an election may be made to 
validate or rescind the contract. 
D. Intoxication 
l, In a general sense, intoxication refers to the 
condition produced by the administration or 
introduction into the human system of a poison. 
In its popular use, the term is restricted to 
"alcoholic" intoxication, that is, drunkenness 
or inebriety, or the mental and physical condi-
tion induced by drinking excessive quantities 
of alcoholic liquors, and this is its meaning 
as used by statutes and indictments. 2 
2, The capacity to contract is not affected by 
intoxication unless it is to such a degree that 
the intoxicated person does not realize he is 
entering into a contract. The situation is the 
same as if he were so insane at the time that 
he did not know what he was doing. If this is 
the case, the contract is voidable and may be 
ratified when the intoxicated person becomes 
sober. If he understands that he is entering 
1National Metal Edge Box Co. v. Vanderveer; 95 Vt. 488; 82A 
837. 
2state v. Pierce, 65 Iowa 85; 21 N.W. 195. 
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into a contract but does not appreciate the 
consequences, the agreement is valid and bind-
ing. 
E. Other Legal Disabilities 
1. The contracts of a person under the influence 
of drugs, or a similar influence, are treated 
in the same manner as those of an intoxicated 
person. 
2. The capacity of a person convicted of a major 
crime to enter into a contract varies from 
state to state. Where a disability exists, it 
terminates upon release from prison or other 
confinement. 
). The rights of aliens to enter into contracts 
has been a subject of much dispute. The current 
weight of authority holds that aliens from 
friendly countries may contract freely; however, 
aliens from unfriendly nations, particularly if 
those nations are at war with the United States, 
have no right to bring suit on a contract in 
any court under the jurisdiction of the United 
States. Their rights are limited to defending 
themselves in the event that suit is brought 
against them. 
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4-. A "spendthrift"1 is powerless to make contracts 
which bind him or his estate except so far as 
necessaries are concerned. 
5. At common law, a married woman had no rights to 
enter into a contract with anyone. This was on 
the theory that husband and wife were one and 
the husband was the "one." Statutes in all 
states have long since changed the common law 
to the effect that a married woman may enter 
into a binding agreement with anyone other than 
her husband. Contracts between husband and 
wife are void. 
a. A contract entered into by parties who sub-
sequently marry is not void; it is rather 
unenforceable as long as coverture lasts. 
b. A contract entered into by parties during 
coverture but who are now legally divorced 
cannot be enforced. An agreement void at 
its inception remains forever void. 
VII. Formality 
A. Statute of Frauds in General 
1. This is the common designation of a celebrated 
English statute passed in 1677, and adopted, 
in more or less modified form, in nearly all of 
the United States. 
1A spendthrift is a person who lavishes or wastes his estate. 
For more extensive treatment of the subject, See: Taylor v. 
KQenigstein~ 128 Neb. 809; 260 N.W. 54-4-. Young v. Young, 
8'1 Me. 4-4-; ~2A. 78c. 
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2. Its object was to close the door to the numer-
ous frauds and perjuries peculiar to certain 
classes of contracts. 
3. Its chief characteristic is the provision that 
no suit or action shall be maintained on any 
agreement coming within the statute unless there 
be written evidence of its existence and of its 
terms. 
B. Agreements Within the Massachusetts Statute1 
1. A promise by an executor or administrator to 
pay out of his own pocket, the debt of the 
deceased 
2. Contracts upon a consideration of marriage 
a. The contract to which the statute applies 
is one by which the defendant agrees to do 
some act in consideration of the plaintiff 
marrying some party other than the defend-
ant. 
b. This provision does not refer to mutual 
promise to marry since breach of promise 
to marry does not constitute a wrong recog-
nized by the Massachusetts court.2 
3. A contract not to be performed within one year 
from the date upon which it went into effect 
a. The contract within this provision is one 
which cannot be fully performed within a 
year. If it may be so performed, it is 
1Mass. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 259 sec. 1 and 5. 
2Mass. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 207 sec. 13A. 
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not within the statute even though perform-
ance does continue beyond one year. 
b. " •••• the agreement was made on December 17, 
1928, when the plaintiff accepted the offer 
of the defendant. The agreement would not 
be within the statute if by its terms, the 
employment of the plaintiff was to begin 
on December 17 or on the following day. 
If, however, the employment was to begin 
later than December 18, the agreement would 
be impossible to perform 'within one year' 
from the time of its making, a contract 
for one year's employment, if the term of 
the employment began later than December 
18."1 
4. An agreement to answer for the debt, default, 
or misdoing of another 
a. The contract to which the statute applies 
is strictly an indemnity contract, collat-
eral to the debt of another who is the 
principal debtor where the primary purpose 
of making the contract is to secure the 
payment of the debt. 
b. A paid his debt to B with the note of 0 
and at the time orally promised B to pay 
the note at maturity if 0 did not pay it. 
It was held that the agreement was within 
the statute.2 
c. The statute does not apply: 
(1) where the promise is to reimburse 
the plaintiff for paying the defend-
ant's debt or is to pay a debt the 
defendant owes to the plaintiff;3 
Beaver v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 299 Mass. 218; 12 N.E.2d 807. 
2Howe v. Swett, 120 Mass. 322. 
3Furbish v. Goodnow, 98 Mass. 296. 
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(2) where the contract is one to indem-
nify the promisee for an obligation 
assumed by the latter;l 
(3) where the"consideration for the de-
fendant's promise is furnished to a 
third person at the request of the 
defendant, so that the debt is that 
of the defendant;2 
(4) where in consequence of the defend-
ant's promise to pay the debt of 
another, th~ latter is released or 
discharged;? 
(5) where the primary purpose of the 
defendant's promise to pay the debt 
of another is the acquisition by the 
defendant of some title, lien, or 
interest in himself.4 
5. An agreement for the sale of land, tenements, 
or hereditaments or any interest in or concern-
ing them 
a. 
b. 
c. 
The statute applies to an oral agreement 
to bu~ and sell an equitable interest in 
land.~ 
An executory oral agreement to lease pro-
perty is within the statute.6 
An oral agreement to create an easement 
over land is within the statute.? 
1Rill v. Oret, 247 Mass. 25; 141 N.E. 593. 
2Rammond Coal Co., Inc. v. Lewis, 248 Mass. 499; 143 N.E. 309. 
3soder v. Kwalowski, 304 Mass. 367; 23 N.E.2d 880. 
4Kahn v. Waldman, 283 Mass. 391; 186 N.E. 587. 
5scott v. McFarland, 13 Mass. 309. 
6Mathews v. Carlson, 189 Mass. 285; 75 N.E. 637. 
?Estabrook v. Wilcox, 226 Mass. 156; 115 N.E. 233. 
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6. Ail agreement to pay a debt discharged by an act 
of bankruptcy 
Ail agreement to sell or a sale of goods or 
chattels to the value of $500.00 and over 
8. Ail agreement to leave property by will 
9. To charge one upon a representation concerning 
the character, conduct, trade-dealings, or 
credit of another 
C. Compliance with the Statute 
1. In each instance above, the statute of frauds 
may be satisfied by the execution of a written 
memorandum which shall include: 
2. 
a. the names or descriptions of the parties; 
b. the subject matter of the contract; 
c. the consideration involved; 
d. the signature of the party sought to be 
charged or his agent. 
The memorandum may be effective even though: 
a. it is a series of writings, none of which 
alone would satisfy the statute but are 
sufficient if considered as a whole, pro-
vided each paper is signed by the party 
sought to be charged or his agent; or 
b. no memorandum exists at the time of the 
contract but it comes into being before 
suit is brought. 
3. The memorandum must be complete within itself. 
It will be considered to be defective if oral 
evidence is needed in order to determine the 
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existence of any element necessary to create a 
valid contract. 
4, With reference to the provision dealing with 
the sale af goods or chattels to the value of 
$500.00 and over, there are three methods in 
addition to a memorandum by which the statute 
may be satisfied, These are: 
a. acceptance and receipt of the goods; 
b, a part payment made by the buyer and accep-
ted by the seller; 
c. by the exchange of something in earnest to 
bind the agreement, 
This is the only section in the statute where 
alternative methods of compliance are allowed, 
D. Failure to Comply with Statute of Frauds 
1. While a few states hold that a failure to comply 
with the statute renders the agreement void, the 
majority merely consider the contract voidable 
and not capable of being enforced. 1 
2. Under the majority view, the statute does not 
affect executed agreements. An action can be 
brought to enforce the contract if the defendant 
does not raise the objection that it is not 
written. The statute, therefore, is considered 
to be a defense or an excuse for nonperformance 
1Ringler v. Ruby, 117 Ore. 455; 244 P, 509. 
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in the case of an executory contract. 
E. Parol Evidence Rule 
1. Under this rule, when the parties elect to put 
their agreement in writing, all previous oral 
agreements merge in the writing, and a contract 
as written cannot be modified or changed by 
parol or oral evidence.l 
2. Parol or extrinsic evidence is not admissible 
to add to or subtract, vary or contradict judi-
cial or official records or documents, or writ-
ten instruments which dispose of property or 
are contractual in nature.2 
a. The rule applies only to prior or simulta-
neous oral agreements which vary or contra-
dict a written instrument. It in no way 
affects subsequent oral provisions. 
b. Oral evidence may always be presented when 
the purpose is to prove that the written 
agreement was entered into as a result of 
fraud practiced by one of the parties. 
c. Oral evidence is permitted to resolve 
ambiguities which appear in the written 
instrument. Where a word or phrase is 
capable of more than one interpretation, 
oral testimony is allowed in order to 
establish which meaning the parties intended. 
d. Where a contract is partly written, or for 
some reason is incomplete, parol evidence 
is permissible to establish the remaining 
1Russell v. Heleman, 287 Ky. 404; 153 S.W.2d 899. 
2\Vheeler, Kelley~ & Haguy Inv. Co. v. Curtis, 158 Kan. 312; 
147 P2d 737, 74v. 
e. 
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provisions of the agreement. This is in 
the nature of completing an otherwise in-
complete instrument rather than contradict-
ing that which already stands in writing. 
Parol evidence is admissible to show that 
a condition precedent to the validity of 
the written instrument had not been met, 
such as where there is an oral agreement 
that a written contract to purchase land 
will not be effective if the buyer cannot 
procure a mortgage. 
F. Interpretation of Contracts 
1. Where a court is faced with two equally possible 
interpretations of the terms of an agreement, 
it will adopt that construction which validates 
the contract rather than that which shall cause 
it to fall. 
a. The basis for the rule is the realization 
by most courts that when parties agree to 
something contractual in nature, their 
intent is to form a binding agreement. 
Courts will honor this intent whenever 
possible. 
b. "Where a contract in writing contains in-
consistent provisions, a clause which re-
quires something to be done to effect the 
general purpose of the contract is entitled 
to greater consideration than one which 
tends to defeat a full performance. The 
rule of construction that if the true im-
port and meaning of the language of an 
instrument are in doubt, it will be con-
strued most stron~ly against the person 
using the uncerta~n language, is to be 
resorted to only when all other rules of 
construction fail."l 
2. Where there is an inconsistency between the 
1Morrill & Whiton Const. Co. v. Boston, 186 Mass. 217; 71 
N.E. 550. 
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printed provisions in a contract and those which 
are written, courts generally hold that the 
writing shall prevail. 
3. If figures do not agree with amounts as spelled 
out in words, the latter prevails. 
4. When evaluating the effect of a contract, courts 
tend to look at the agreement as a single unit 
and not as a series of component parts. 
G. Conflict of Laws 
1. The problem of conflict of laws arises where: 
a. a citizen of the United States and a citizen 
of a foreign country enter into some legal 
relationship wherein the laws of these two 
nations differ; 
b. a citizen of one state and a citizen of 
another state within the United States 
enter into some legal relationship wherein 
the laws of these two states differ; 
c. the state with jurisdiction to hear a matter 
which is the subject of litigation is not 
the state in which the alleged legal obli-
gations arose, and there is a difference 
in the law with reference to the dispute; 
d. there is a conflict between the law of a 
state and the federal or constitutional law. 
2. Normally, the validity of a contract will be 
determined by the law of the country or state 
where the agreement was made, irrespective of 
where suit is brought. If, for instance, a 
contract is made in Maine but litigation is 
commenced in Massachusetts, where the defendant 
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now lives, Massachusetts will look to see how 
Maine would decide the matter and act accordingly. 
3. The rule that the validity of a contract is to 
be determined by tne law of the place where made 
is subject to one exception. If the law of the 
foreign state is truly repugnant to local policy, 
the court which entertains the litigation, known 
as the "forum," will decide the case on the 
basis of its own law. This happen£ very infre-
quently. 
4. For purposes of determining where a contract is 
made, the court will look to that place where 
the last act necessary to the creation of a 
valid and binding agreement was done. This is 
usually the state where acceptance of the offer 
took place. 
5. If the question is one of deciding whether the 
parties were competent to contract, the law of 
the state where the contract was entered into 
governs. 
6. Whether contract rights or obligations may be 
assigned is determined by the law of the state 
where the assignment was attempted. 
7. If a question arises as to whether a defendant 
is excused from performing a contract, the law 
" 
of the state where the contract is to be per-
formed governs and also decides the amount of 
damages, if any. 
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8. The law of the forum will be used insofar as 
they pertain to: 
a. rules of procedure such as rules of evi-
dence, conduct at the trial, and the type 
of court in which the case is to be heard; 
b. the statute of limitations, or in connec-
tion with any other law which defines the 
length of time a plaintiff has in which to 
commence his action. 
9. Once a court of competent jurisdiction decides 
a matter under litigation, all states are re-
quired, under the Federal Constitution, to give 
10. 
this judgment full faith and credit. 
If there is a conflict between any state law 
and the law of the federal government or the 
law of the land as defined by the United States 
Constitution it is universally held that the 
law of the state shall be declared null and void. 
VIII.Nature and Transfer of Contract Rights 
A. Joint and Several Contracts 
1. A contract is considered "joint" when two or 
more persons jointly promise to perform an obli-
gation, or in which two or more persons are 
jointly entitled to the benefit of the perform-
ance by the other party or parties. 
a. 
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Upon the death of a joint obligor, the 
burden of completing an executory contract 
falls upon the remaining obligor or obligors. 
b. Normally, if suit is commenced against one joint obligor, all joint obligors must be joined in the same action. Likewise, if 
parties are jointly entitled to be plain-
tiffs in a given suit, all must join in 
commencing the litigation. 
c. If a judgment is awarded against joint 
obligors, it may be satisfied against any 
one or all the joint obligors. If judg-
ment is satisfied against one, he is en-
titled to contribution against his co-
obligors providing he is not responsible 
for the breach of contract. 
d. It is generally held that a release from 
liability given to one who is jointly 
liable has the effect of releasing all the joint obligors. 
2. A several contract is one in which each promissor 
makes a separate promise and is separately liable 
thereon. The separate promises are set forth in 
the same agreement. 
a. Since the obligations created under a 
several contract are separate and distinct, 
it is possible to bring suit against one 
who is severally liable without joining 
the others as party defendants. 
b. The burden of performing the obligation of 
a deceased party who is severally liable 
on a contract falls upon the personal repre-
sentative or estate of the deceased, not 
upon the surviving obligors. 
c. A release from liability given to one who 
is severally liable has no effect on the 
remaining obligors. 
3. Although rarely encountered, some contracts are 
considered to be both joint and several. In 
such a situation, the obligor or obligee may 
treat the claim as one entire obligation or a 
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series of separate obligations. For instance, 
a joint and several promissory note consists of 
the joint promise of all, and the separate pro-
mise of each. 
B. Third Party Beneficiary Contracts 
1. A third party beneficiary contract is an agree-
ment entered into between two or more parties 
with the intent or result that a person not a 
party to the original agreement stands to benefit. 
2. Most states, with the notable exceptions of New 
York and Massachusetts, recognize the right of 
the third party beneficiary to protect his 
interests by bringing suit against the party in 
default on the contract. ']~his is particularly 
true where the beneficiary is a creditor of the 
obligee in the contract. 
a. Assume X says to Y, "If you will lend me 
$100.00 today, I will pay your rent of 
$100.00 to L, your landlord, when it is 
due one week from today." In most states, 
L would be considered a creditor benefici-
ary who could bring suit against X if the 
latter defaults on his promise to Y. It 
should be noted, however, that Y's liabil-
ity to L is not extinguished in the event 
that L fails to satisfy his judgment against 
x. 
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b, Many states hold that even where the bene-
ficiary is a donee beneficiary, his rights 
may not be destroyed by a breach of the 
initial contract. This is the situation 
which exists when, as a result of the con-
tract, an individual stands to receive a 
' gift; however, again, this individual is 
not a party to the contract. 
c. If the performance of a promise would 
indirectly benefit a person not a party to 
a contract, such person is an incidental 
beneficiary. .It is generally held that an 
incidental beneficiary acquires no legally 
enforceable rights. Assume A promises B, 
for a consideration, to plant a valuable 
nut orchard on B's land, Such improvement 
would increase the value of the adjacent 
property. C, the owner of the adjacent 
land, is an incidental beneficiary. He has 
no remedy if A breaches his contract with 
B. In order for a third party beneficiary 
to recover, it must appear that the contract 
was made and intended for his benefit,l 
3, Massachusetts does not recognize the third party 
beneficiary doctrine. "The general rule is, and 
always has been, that a plaintiff, in an action 
on a simple contract, must be the person from 
whom the consideration of the contract actually 
moved, and that a stranger to the contract can-
not sue thereon. The rule is sometimes thus 
expressed: there must be a privity of contract 
between the plaintiff and the defendant in order 
to render the defendant liable to an action by 
the plaintiff on the contract. The only 
lFagliarone v. Consolidated Film Industries, 20 N.J. Ndsc, 
193; 26 A.2d 425, 426. 
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exceptions to the rule are the following: 
a. where the defendant has in his hands money 
which, in equity and good conscience, be-
longs to the plaintiff, suit will lie even 
though there is no direct consideration 
between plaintiff and defendant; 
, b. cases where promises have been made to a 
father or uncle for the benefit of a child 
or nephew; 
c. cases of suits by a lessor against an 
assignee of a lease in possession of the 
premises; 
d. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
compositions of creditors which are sus-
tained on grounds of estoppel; 
voluntary subscriptions particularly where 
there is reliance on the subscription; 
bills in equity based upon equitable prin-
ciples of exoneration and subrogation; 
actions by beneficiaries of policies of 
insurance under statutory provisions; 
cases permitted in equity in order to pre-
vent circuity of action,l 
C. Contractual Assignments 
1. An assignment, as it pertains to contracts, is 
any transfer by a party to a contract of his 
rights or duties or obligations under the agree-
ment to a person not a party to the contract. It 
includes transfers of all kinds of property. 2 
1Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray (Mass.) 317. 
2Bostrom v. Bostrom, 60 N.D. 792; 236 N.W. 732, 734. 
a. In order for the assignment to be valid, 
it is necessary that the contract which 
has created the rights or liabilities to 
be assigned, be in existence at the time 
the assignment is made.l 
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b. The right to assign is ordinarily limited 
to transfers of choses in action and to 
rights in or connected with property, as 
distingui~hed from the particular item of 
property. 
2. "A valid assignment may be made by any words or 
acts which fairly indicate an intention to make 
the assignee the owner of the claim. The impor-
tant thing is the act and the evidence of intent; 
formalities are not material. Nor is it neces-
sary that there should be any consideration where 
the question arises between the assignee and the 
debtor. n3 
Partial assignments are not recognized at law. 
They may, however, in proper cases, be enforced 
in equity. "An assignment of part of the fund, 
against the consent of the drawee is void at 
law, because the partial assignee is not an 
attorney with power to sue in the assignor's 
name, and because a debtor is not to have his 
1
rn re Lynch's Estate, 272 N.Y. 597; 151 Misc. 549. 
2m re Baffa's Estate, 54 Cal. App. 186; 201 P. 616, 617. 
3cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Match Co., 249 Mass. 14; 
143 N.E. 827. 
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responsibilities so far varied from the terms 
of his original contract as to subject him to 
-distinct demands on the part of several persons 
when his contract was one and entire. In equity, 
how~ver, the objections to a partial assignment 
disappear. All persons in interest can be 
brought before the court in a single suit, and 
a decree can be entered which will protect the 
rights of all parties concerned. 1 
4. The law does not give the right to assign all 
types of benefits and obligations under a con-
tract. 
a. The right to money, as a benefit under a 
contract, may always be assigned.2 
b. If the benefit expected under the contract 
is something other than money, the validity 
of the assignment is determined by examining 
the effect of the said assignment upon the 
person obligated to furnish that benefit 
under the terms of the contract. If the 
burdens of the initial obligor would in any 
way be increased, the assignment is void. 
(2) Assume S makes a contract to sell 
certain goods to B with the provision 
that B is to pick the goods up at S's 
place of business. B may assign this 
benefit to c. It would make no dif-
ference to S who picks the goods up. 
Andrews Elec. Inc. v. St. Alphonse Catholic Total Abstinence, 
233 Mass. 20; 123 N.E. 103. 
2Adler v. Kan. City Springfield and Memphis N.E. Co., 92 No. 
242; 4 s.w. 917. 
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(2) Assume S makes a contract to sell and 
deliver certain goods to B. B could 
not assign this right to C particu-
larly where C is a further distance 
from C than is B. This would place 
a burden on S not contemplated in 
the original agreement. 
c. In like manner, where a person obligates 
himself to perform to the personal satis-
faction of another, the latter may not 
assign this benefit so that the obligor now 
must please a person who was a stranger to 
the original agreement. Similarly, it is 
held that the relationship of employer and 
employee is so personal that it may not be 
assigned.l 
d. The rule with reference to assigning duties 
under a contract is based on much the same 
considerations. If the duties are mechani-
cal in nature, such as to deliver a ton of 
coal, they may be assigned. If they involve 
a high degree of judgment or skill, such as 
a doctor or lawyer, the duties may not be 
assigned. 
5. The assignee's rights rise no higher than those 
of the assignor. If the other party to the con-
tract could successfully defend against a suit 
brought by the assignor, he will also prevail 
against the assignee. If the assignee sues the 
obligor, he may then be met by the defense that 
there was no consideration or that there was a 
failure of consideration; that the original con-
tract is invalid because of fraud or mistake; 
or that the original contract is invalid because 
1Rochester R. Co. v. Rochester, 205 u.s. 236. 
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it is not in writing as required by the statute 
of frauds; or because of the incapacity of one 
of the original parties. The obligor may also 
assert against the assignee a defense based on 
a counterclaim or setoff for defective workman-
ship of the assignor. 
6. An assignment, if otherwise valid, takes full 
effect from the moment that it is made. It is 
not necessary that the assignee or the assignor 
give notice to the other party to the contract 
that the assignment has been made. 
a. As a practical matter, the assignee, to 
protect his interests, should give notice 
of the assignment to the obligor. If the 
obligor, in ignorance of the assignment, 
settles accounts with the assignor, he, 
the obligor, is discharged from any further 
responsibility under the contract. If the 
obligor settles accounts with the assignor, 
notwithstanding knowledge of the assignment, 
the assignee will have a valid claim against 
the obligor. 
b. If the assignor attempts to assign the very 
same benefit to more than one party, he 
will prevail who first notifies the obligor 
of the assignment. 
7. By implication, it is held that the assignor 
makes certain warranties or guarantees which may 
be stated as follows: 
a. the assignor is regarded as impliedly war-
ranting that the right he assigns is valid; 
b. the assignor warrants that he will not 
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interfere in any way with the attempts of 
the assignee to enforce the obligations of 
the original contract. 
It may be well to emphasize that the assignor 
does not warrant that the other party will pay 
or perform as required by the contract, but 
merely that the right against the other party 
is a valid or legally enforceable one. 
IX. Discharge of Contracts and Remedies 
A. Methods by which a Contract is Discharged 
1. Since a contract is a voluntary agreement, it 
may be discharged, at any time, upon the mutual 
consent of all parties to the contract. Notice 
to terminate must be clear and definite. 1 
2. A contract may be discharged by performance of 
all required obligations under the agreement. 
a. At common law, a party to a contract was 
required to comply exactly with all its 
provisions before he could recover from 
the other party. 
b. Today, by virtue of a rule most often 
applied in building contracts, a plaintiff 
may recover if he has tendered substantial 
performance in good faith, subject to any 
counterclaim which the other party may 
have as a result of the contract not being 
carried out to the letter. 
c. Under 
taken 
set. 
common law, performance must have 
place no later than the date originally 
Under modern law, the rule is contrary 
1shaw v. Beall, 70 Ariz. 4; 215 P.2d 233. 
• 
90 
unless it can be shown that performance on 
the date set in the agreement is vital. 
d. It is generally held that if performance is 
to include the payment of money, only the 
tender of legal currency discharges the 
obligation. If payment is made by check, 
it is normally considered to be a conditional 
discharge, subject to whether or not the 
drawee bank honors the instrument. 
3. In certain situations, a contract may be dis-
charged because it is or becomes impossible to 
perform it. 
a. If, without the knowledge or fault of either 
party, an object which is to be the subject 
matter of the contract is no longer in exist-
ence at the time the agreement is entered 
into, neither party will be held responsible 
to the other for damages. 
b. If the contract requires the doing of an act 
or service, either party may, at the time 
the agreement is entered into, provide that 
he shall not be liable for acts of God, or 
for other circumstances beyond his power to 
control. If such provision is not made, 
the only recognizable excuse for nonperform-
ance is a change in the law which makes the 
execution of the contract illegal.l 
c. When the contract obligates a party to per-
form an act that requires personal skill, 
or which contemplates a personal relation-
ship with the other party, the death or 
disabiliti of that obligor discharges the 
contract.2 
d. When the promisee prevents performance or 
otherwise makes performance impossible, the 
promisor is discharged from the contract.3 
1Rose v. Inhabitants of Peabody, 207 Mass. 226; 93 N.E. 604. 
2volk v. Stowell, 98 Wis. 385; 74 N.W. 118. 
3Phoenix Tempe Stone Co. v. De Waard, 20 P.2d 757. 
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4. In certain situations, a contract is said to be 
discharged by operation of law in the sense that 
it is treated as nonexistent, or merely the right 
to enforce it may be destroyed. 
a. A written contract may be discharged by 
law if it is altered. However: 
(1) the alteration must be material; 
(2) it must be made by a party to the 
contract; 
(3) it must be intentionally; 
(4) it must be made without the consent 
of the other party to the contract. 
b. A contract right may be merged into a 
greater right and hence the contract would 
be discharged. This normally occurs when 
a plaintiff successfully sues a defendant 
in court. The judgment awarded takes the 
place of any previous rights which plain-
tiff may have had against defendant. 
c. A discharge in bankruptcy is a bar to the 
subsequent enforcement of contract claims 
against the debtor. As noted under the 
statute of frauds, this defense may be 
waived by the debtor if in writing and for 
a valid consideration. 
d. If the statute of limitations has run, con-
tract rights are discharged by operation 
of law. 
(1) The term "limitation" means the time 
at the end of which no action at law 
or suit in equity may be commenced.l 
(2) In contract law, suit must be commenced 
within six years from the day on which 
the contract was breached. 
1uscienski v. National Sugar Refining Co., 18 A.2d 611, 612; 
19 N.J. Misc. 240. 
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(3) As has been pointed out, if a contract 
is under seal, the statute of limita-
tions is raised from six to twenty 
years. 
B. Breach of Contract 
1. A breach of contract is a failure, without legal 
excuse, to perform any promise which forms the 
whole or part of a contract. 1 
2. "In the absence of special exculpating circum-
stances, an intentional departure from the pre-
cise requirements of the contract is not consist-
ent with good faith in the endeavor to fully 
perform it, and unless such departure is so 
trifling as to fall within the rule of 'de mini-
mus,' it bars all recovery. 2 
3. "It is settled that ordinarily a written contract, 
before breach, may be varied by a subsequent oral 
agreement made on sufficient consideration. Such 
a subsequent oral agreement may enlarge the time 
of performance, or may vary any other term of 
the contract, or may discharge it altogether. 
This rule applies to both sealed instruments and 
simple contracts."3 
1Friedman v. Katzner, 139 Md. 195; 114 A. 884, 886. 
2Andre v. Maguire, 305 Mass. 515; 26 N.E.2d 347. 
3Klotnick v. McNamara, 301 Mass. 224; 16 N.E.2d 632. 
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4. Ordinarily, one is not liable for breach of 
contract until the day of performance has come 
and passed. Massachusetts does not allow a 
plaintiff to anticipate a breach of contract.1 
c. Remedies for Breach of Contract at Law 
1. The injured party may elect to "rescind" the 
contract. Under the doctrine of rescission, any 
consideration received is returned to the origi-
nal parties. The rescinding party elects to 
return to status quo and treat the contract as 
nonexistent. 2 This entire procedure may ordi-
narily be effected outside of court. 
2. The injured party may sue for damages. Where 
suit is brought, courts endeavor to put the 
plaintiff into the position he would have been 
in but for the breach of contract. In a law 
court, this is done by evaluating the loss or 
harm to the plaintiff in terms of money. 
D. Types of Damages 
1. Nominal damages which are a trifling sum, nor-
mally one dollar, are awarded to a plaintiff in 
an action where there is no substantial loss or 
injury to be compensated, but still the law 
recognizes a technical invasion of the plaintiff's 
1
collins v. Snow, 218 Mass. 542, 546; 106 N.E. 148. 
2Kunds v. O'Brien, 214 Iowa 921; 243 N.W. 594, 595. 
rights. Nominal damages are also awarded in 
situations where actual harm has been suffered 
but the plaintiff is not able to show how much. 1 
2. Compensatory damages are those awarded when 
actual harm has been suffered, and the exnent 
of the harm may be proved or shown with reason-
able certainty. They are damages which will make 
good the loss or injury caused by the wrongful 
breach. 2 
3. "Exemplary damages are damages on an increased 
scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and above 
what will barely compensate him for his loss, 
where the wrong done to him was aggravated by 
circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, 
fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part 
of the defendant, and are intended to solace 
the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of 
his feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggra-
vations of the original wrong, or else to punish 
the defendant for his evil behavior, or to make 
an example of him, for which reason they 
are also called 'punitive' or 'punitory' damages,"3 
Springer v, Fuel Co., 196 Pa. 156; 46 A. 370. 
2wade v. Power Co., 51 S.C. 296; 29 S.E. 233, 
3Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541; 5 P. 119. 
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As a practical matter, exemplary damages are 
awarded rather infrequently in contract actions. 
They are £ar more frequent in tort actions. 
4. Generally, a defendant in a contract action is 
liable only for those damages which a reasonable 
person could have foreseen at the time of the 
breach. He is not ordinarily liable for an 
unusual or unexpected result of his failure to 
perform, not reasonably to be anticipated. 
5. Occasionally, the parties may agree at the time 
the agreement is entered into as to what the 
penalty will be for a failure to perform as pro-
mised under the contract. If this is done, it 
has the effect of giving the parties a choice 
of performing as agreed or paying an agreed sum 
in default. Damages of this nature are referred 
to as "liquidated damages."1 
6. The term "general damages" is quite common in 
the law of contracts. They are damages which 
the law implies or presumes to have accrued from 
the wrong complained of, for the reason that they 
are its immediate, direct and proximate result, 
or such as necessarily result from the injury 
without reference to the special character, 
1For further discussion on this point, See: Hakin v. Scott, 
70 Tex. 442; 7 s.w. 777. Davidow v. Wentworth Mfg. Co., 
211 Mich. 90: 178 N.w. 776. 
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condition, or circumstances of the plaintiff.! 
E. Equity and Specific Performance 
1. Equity, in its broadest and most general signi-
ficance, denotes the spirit and habit of fairness 
and proper dealing which regulate the relation-
ship of man with his fellow man. 
2. In its restricted sense, equity refers to a tri-
bunal of justice entirely separate from the com-
mon law courts. It is most frequently referred 
to as "the court of conscience," since its main 
function is to administer justice which could 
not otherwise be had if none but courts of law 
existed. 
3. The cases in which jurisdiction in equity has 
been entertained fall into three basic classifi-
cations. They are: 
a. cases of jurisdiction because the subject 
matter of the controversy is equitable. 
In this category are cases of trusts and 
equitable charges; 
b. cases, a distinguishing characteristic of 
which is that the parties occupy a certain 
status or bear a particular relationship 
to each other. In this class are suits 
between husband and wife, co-owners, part-
ners, and others; 
c. cases in which the law provides no suitable 
remedy for the injured party so•that he is 
1Kane v. New Deal Realty Co., 104 Conn. 508; 113 A. 686, 687. 
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forced to turn to equityi the court of con-
science, for adequa~e re ief. 
4. It is a well-settled principle that equity will 
not entertain jurisdiction where there is a 
plain, complete, and adequate remedy at law. 
"Equity takes jurisdiction only when the common 
law remedy, though available, is not an adequate 
protection to the wronged party."1 
5. In the area of contracts, a court of law will 
always award money damages to the injured party. 
If the aggrieved party feels that money damages 
are inadequate, he may petition the court of 
equity for an order that the breaching party 
yield up the object of the contract rather than 
payment of money damages. This extraordinary 
relief is discretionary with the court of equity. 
They must be convinced that the article in ques-
tion is unique in some way or is virtually 
irreplaceable. 
a. If A makes a contract with Y to purchase 
Y's 1955 Ford and Y refuses to go through 
with the agreement, A's only remedy would 
be at law for money damages. This is be-
cause objects of this description are 
plentiful, and the plaintiff may easily 
obtain another one. 
McLaughlin v. Levenbaum, 248 Mass. 170; 142 N.E. 906. 
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b. If Y agreed to sell A the first Ford ever 
built, as a collector's item, and then re-
fused to comply with the contract, A could 
probably ~rove that mere money damages 
would be ~nadequate, and Y would be forced 
to turn the car over to A. 
6. The decree by which a court of equity awards the 
object of the contract rather than money damages 
is known as "specific performance." 
7. It is well to note that equity will always give 
specific performance when dealing with contracts 
for the sale of land. This is so because all 
land is considered unique. No two parcels of 
land are the same. 1 
8. Specific performance is never given in the case 
of contracts involving a service or labor as 
distinguished from a particular object. This 
is so for two reasons: 
a. 
b. 
the Federal Constitution prohibits involun-
tary servitude; 
it would be virtually impossible for the 
court to supervise the job being done to 
see that it measured up to required speci-
fications. 
9. "Specific performance is not a matter of strict 
and absolute right. A petition therefore is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 
It will not be granted, if the result would be 
oppressive or unfair, or if the plaintiff has 
been guilty of conduct covered with injustice 
touching the transaction." 
1Forman v. Gadouns, 247 Mass. 207; 142 N.E. 87. 
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MASTERY TEST 
True-False 
Directions: Indicate whether the following statements are 
TRUE or FALSE by placing a T or F in the space 
provided before each sentence. 
1. Modern economic life depends upon the protection of 
rights created by contracts. 
2. A contract on which the signatures of the parties are 
followed by the letters L.s. is a contract of record. 
3. A cash sale is an executory contract. 
4. In a bilateral contract, one promise is given in 
exchange for another. 
5. An offer of a reward in a newspaper can be revoked 
by using the same means of communication. 
6. A party may avoid his contract if he has made a mis-
take through ignorance of law. 
7. A contract is voidable if one of the parties is 
guilty of fraud. 
8. Forbearance consists of the performance of an act or 
a promise to perform. 
9. In the absence of fraud or other irregularity, courts 
generally ignore adequacy of consideration. 
10. Consideration is necessary for a debt of record. 
11. Past consideration is valid and binding. 
12. An offer made on Sunday is void regardless of the 
day on which it is accepted. 
• 
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13. An agreement by one who sells his business to refrain 
from competing with the buyer is void. 
14. An adult may avoid his contract on the grounds that 
the other party was a minor. 
15. An intoxicated person may avoid his contract even 
though he knew he was making a contract. 
16. A minor is liable for the reasonable value of neces-
saries which a merchant supplies to him at the request 
of the minor. 
17. A convict's disability exists only during the period 
of his imprisonment. 
18. The statute of frauds applies to an executed oral 
agreement. 
19. In most states an agreement that does not comply with 
the statute of frauds is voidable. 
20. The theory of the parol evidence rule is that a 
written contract includes all terms upon which the 
parties agreed. 
21. The writing required by the statute of frauds must 
be signed by both parties. 
22. An agreement to pay for having the title to real 
estate checked must be in writing. 
23. An agreement that cannot be performed within one 
year after the contract is made must be written. 
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24. A several contract arises when two or more persons 
jointly agree to perform the same obligation. 
25. The party who makes an assignment is called the 
assignee. 
26. Third party beneficiary contracts are valid in most 
states. 
27. The right to money under a future contract may be 
assigned. 
28. The performance of a standardized duty can be dele-
gated without the consent of the other party to the 
contract. 
29. A right to buy goods may be assigned if the perform-
ance required by the seller is not materially altered. 
30. An assignment must be supported by consideration. 
31. Payment by check is ordinarily a conditional discharge 
of the obligation to pay. 
32. A tender of payment that is refused by the other 
party discharges the obligation to pay. 
33. Substantial performance of a contract entitles the 
party who makes such performance to full payment. 
34. An oral mutual rescission can terminate a written 
contract. 
35. An act of God which makes performance difficult or 
impossible usually terminates a contract • 
.. , 
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36. A contract requiring a performance that involves 
personal skill is discharged by the death of the 
obligor, 
37. Specific performance is given in land contracts. 
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38. A discharge in bankruptcy destroys all debts of the 
debtor. 
39. A minor may ratify his contracts at any time, 
40, An enemy alien can sue on existing contracts. 
41. At common law, a female attains her majority on her 
twenty-first birthday. 
42. A necessary is defined in terms of the financial and 
social status of the minor. 
43. A minor can avoid part of his contract. 
44, A promise to pay for the abandonment of the prosecu-
tion of a criminal case is void, 
45. A lobbying contract is void. 
46, The most common rate of interest in the various states 
is eight per cent. 
47. A promise to pay for the services of an unlicensed 
dentist can be enforced, 
48, Wagers are generally held to be legal. 
49. Hedging enables a manufacturer to protect himself 
against losses from fluctuations in the price of a 
commodity he uses. 
50. Punitive damages are rarely awarded in contract actions. 
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MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Directions: Select the proper word or phrase that will make 
the statement correct. Use the parentheses for 
your answers. 
1. A contract in which only the obligation of one party has 
been discharged is called a: 
a. sealed contract 
b. executory contract 
c. executed contract 
d. none of these 
2. A person who makes a binding promise is called the: 
a. obligee 
b. promisee 
c. trustee 
d. none of these 
( ) 
( ) 
A contract that is formed by means of an exchange of 
oral promises is called: 
a. simple contract 
b. contract of record 
c. recognizance 
d. none of these ( ) 
4. A contract in which the evidence of the agreement is 
shown by the acts of the parties is called: 
a. implied contract 
b. express contract 
c. quasi contract 
d. none of these ( ) 
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5. A contract that may be rejected by one of the parties 
is called: 
a. void contract 
b. voidable contract 
c. executory contract 
d. none of these 
6. A catalogue that specifies the seller's price for a 
portable radio would be considered an: 
a. agreement 
b. offer 
c. invitation to negotiate 
d. none of these 
7. A counter offer has the effect of: 
a. creating simultaneous offers 
b. creating a voidable contract 
c. destroying the original offer 
d. none of these 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
8. A good example of a confidential relationship would be: 
a. vendor and vendee 
b. landlord and tenant 
c. parent and child 
d. none of these ( ) 
9. A threat of economic loss is considered: 
a. undue influence 
b. duress 
c. fraud 
d. none of these ( ) 
105 
10. One of the areas in which the requirement of considera-
tion is waived is: 
a. voluntary subscriptions 
b. substantial performance 
c. minors' contracts 
d. none of these ( ) 
11. A contract made by a minor with an insane person would 
be considered: 
a. void 
b. voidable 
c. valid 
d. none of these ( ) 
12. A contract entered into between husband and wife would 
be considered: 
a. void 
b. voidable 
c. valid 
d. none of these ( ) 
13. A friendly alien who enters into a contract in the United 
States may: 
a. sue but not be sued on the contract 
b. not sue but may be sued on the contract 
c. neither sue nor be sued on the contract 
d. none of these ( ) 
14. The writing required 
a/an 
by the statute of frauds is called 
a. agreement 
b. recognizance 
c. memorandum 
d. none of these ( ) 
• 
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15. In an assignment, the assignor warrants: 
a. that the obligor will pay or perform 
b. that the obligor is not a minor 
c. that the claim is a valid one 
d. none of these ( ) 
16. Specific performance may be awarded by a court of: 
a. law 
b. equity 
c. probate 
d. none of these ( ) 
17. A good example where specific performance would usually 
be given is in a contract to: 
a. sell a new car 
b. sing at a night club 
c. sell a typewriter 
d. none of these ( ) 
18. An intentional material alteration of a written contract 
without consent will: 
a. make the contract void 
b. make the contract voidable 
c. have no effect on the contract 
d. none of these ( ) 
19. Where the damages awarded by the court are intended to 
put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in 
but for the breach, they are called: 
a. nominal 
b. compensatory 
c • puni t.i ve 
d. none of these ( ) 
20. A release of one joint obligor on a contract has the 
effect of: 
a. discharging all the obligors 
b, discharging only major obligors 
c. making the contract void 
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d. none of these ( ) 
108 
MATCHING TEST 
Directions: In the parentheses after each expression in 
column II, write the letter of the word or 
phrase in column I that is most closely related 
to it. 
COLUMN I COLUMN II 
a. usury l. bribery or coercion on 
a legislative body ( ) 
b. quasi contract 
2. transfer of rights or 
c. unilateral contract duties under a 
contract ( ) 
d. valuable consideration 
3. little or no harm 
e. lobbying contract caused by breach of 
contract ( ) 
f. statute of frauds 
4. love and affection 
g. assignment between parties ( ) 
h. statute of limitations 5. an act in exchange 
for a promise ( ) 
i. nominal damages 
6. an unlawful rate of 
j. bilateral contract interest ( ) 
k. rescission 7. forced agreement to 
prevent unjust ) 1. consideration enrichment ( 
m. parol evidence rule 8. all provisions of 
the contract are 
n. fair trade spelled out ( ) 
o. express contract 9. time in which the 
law allows suits to 
be begun ( ) 
10. requires certain 
contracts to be 
in writing ( ) 
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.~ ESSAY 
Directions: In each of the following cases, state your 
finding and the applicable rule of law in the 
spaces provided. In this section only, each 
question will be weighted!!£ points. 
1. When D's subscription to a magazine for one year had 
expired, P, the publisher, continued to mail him a copy 
of each issue. D read the magazine but took no other 
action. Could P collect the annual subscription price 
at the end of the second year? Decision and rule: ____ _ 
2. D agreed to sell to P a piano which was stored in the 
attic of D's house. Before the agreement was made and 
unknown to both parties, the piano was destroyed by fire. 
Was D bound by the agreement? Decision and rule: ____ __ 
3. While D is out ot town on a vacation trip, P takes care 
of D's garden and lawn. When D returns, he promises to 
pay P $25.00. Is D's promise enforceable? Decision and 
rule=-------------------------------------------------
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4. D owes P $400.00. Ten days before the debt is due, P 
accepts D's payment of $350.00 in settlement of the en-
tire debt. Can P collect the $50.00 balance? Decision 
and rule: __________________________________________ ___ 
5. As soon as P attains his majority, he sells a car which 
he bought from D when he (P) was a minor. A week later, 
P disaffirms his contract for the purchase of the car. 
Can P recover the payment that he made for the purchase? 
Decision and rule: ______________________________________ __ 
6. Upon X's death, D, the administrator, made the necessary 
burial arrangements. Must a promise to pay such expenses 
out of the estate be in writing? Decision and rule: 
7. After P and D orally agreed upon the terms of a contract, 
D, in P's presence, dictated a memorandum of the agree-
ment to his secretary, X. In preparing the transcription, 
X inadvertently omitted a provision of the agreement. 
In an action on the contract, could parol evidence by 
introduced to prove the omission? Decision and rule: 
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8. P entered into a written contract with D. One of the 
provisions prohibited the assignment of any right or duty 
under the contract. D, nevertheless,assigned the fee of 
$100.00 which he was entitled to under the contract to X. 
Is the assignment valid? Decision and rule: __________ _ 
9. P's claim of $275.00 against D was barred by the statute 
of limitations. D later wrote to P that he would pay the 
debt to clear his name and honor. Could P enforce this 
promise by D to pay? Decision and rule: ______________ __ 
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10. P entered D's store and offered to buy certain goods on 
thirty days' credit. D, not knowing P and believing him 
to be X, sold the goods on the proposed terms. When D 
learned of his mistake, was he entitled to avoid the 
agreement? Decision and rule: ________________________ __ 
" 
" 
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KEY TO MASTERY TEST 
True-False 
1. T 11. F 21. F 31. T 41. T 2. F 12. F 22. F 32. F 42. T 
3. F 13. F 23. T 33. F 43. F 4. T 14. F 24. F 34. T 44. T 
5· T 15. F 25. F 35. F 45. T 
6. F 16. T 26. T 36. T 46. F 
7. T 17. T 27. F 37. T 47. F 
8. F 18. F 28. T 38. F 48. F 
9. T 19. T 29. T 39. F 49. T 
10. F 20. T 30. F 40. F 50. T 
Multiple Choice Test Matching Test 
1. b 11. b 1. e 
2. d 12. a 2. g 
3. a 13. d 3. i 
4. a 14. c 4. d 
5· b 15. c 5. c 
6. c 16. b 6. a 
7· c 17. d 7· b 8. c 18. a 8. 0 
9· d 19. b 9. h 10. a 20. a 10. f 
Essay 
1. YES. In the case of prior dealings, silence may be con-
strued to be an acceptance. 
2. NO. Where the object of the discussion is destroyed be-
fore the contract is entered into, and if the fact is 
not known, neither party is bound by the agreement. 
3. NO. Past consideration is no consideration. 
4. NO. The debtor has paid before the debt is due. This 
is a valid consideration for a lesser settlement. 
5. NO. Sale of the car after majority constitutes a rati-
fication and P will not be allowed to disaffirm. 
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6. NO. This is not a promise by a personal representative 
to pay a debt of the deceased out of his own pocket. 
7. YES. Parol evidence is allowed to show that the writing 
did not express the true intention of the parties in 
the case of mechanical errors such as this. 
8. YES. The law considers a restriction on the right to 
assign money as against public policy. The provision 
may be ignored. 
10. 
YES. In most states, a written promise to pay a debt 
discharged by the statute of limitations revives the 
right of the creditor to collect. 
NO. Where the parties deal face to face, it is of no 
consequence that one of the parties was mistaken as to 
the identity of the other unless fraud was involved. 
CHAPTER IV 
TEACHING SUGGESTIONS 
Instruction in any phase of available knowledge may only 
be justified on the basis of sound and attainable goals and 
objectives. The values to the student which may be derived 
from a study of contracts are, for the most part, common to 
the entire area of business law and may be stated as follows: 
1. The student develops an appreciation of the value of a 
sound judicial system to a free and dynamic economy. 
2. The student becomes aware of the distinction between 
merely a promise and a binding agreement which the law 
will enforce. 
3. The student becomes familiar with many important legal 
words and phrases necessary for an adequate understanding 
of the subject matter. 
4. The analysis of legal cases and hypothetical factual 
situations affords the student the opportunity of devel-
oping his reasoning powers. 
5. The student recognizes those matters which demand the 
attention of a lawyer in order that his interests be 
fully protected. 
6. The student becomes aware of the functions of the courts, 
judges, and juries. 
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The following are suggestions which may be utilized in the 
presentation of the unit in order that the foregoing may be 
realized. 
1. The instructor should keep in mind that the student of 
business law is not being trained to become an attorney. 
Particularly in this area, there exists the danger that 
the main learning objectives are lost in a maze of tech-
nicalities and exceptions to rules. While it is true 
that the college student should be considerably more 
versed in the subject than the high school pupil, it 
serves no useful purpose to advance beyond the point 
where the knowledge gained will have little or no prac-
tical application. The instructor should, therefore, 
concentrate on the more important general principles and 
note exceptions only when they are pertinent to an under-
standing of the principle, or where the exception occurs 
frequently enough to justify its discussion. 
2. In the teaching of each topic within the unit, the in-
structor should attempt to keep student interest at a 
maximum by using illustrations of current importance. 
If in point, students may be allowed to relate their 
personal experiences. 
3. Ample opportunity should be allowed for class discussion 
and questions. Pure lecture on the part of the teacher 
should be kept to a minimum. 
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4. The subject of business law offers many excellent oppor-
tunities for student activities. If time permits, a most 
interesting activity is the presentation of a moot court 
where the students conduct a mock trial complete with 
judge and jury. A field trip to the local court to watch 
an actual case being heard may be of great value. In this 
connection, it is wise to inquire from the clerk of the 
court as to the type of cases that are on the court calen-
dar for the day of the proposed visit. The reasons for 
this are quite obvious. Guest speakers are also recom-
mended, preferably a practicing attorney, a judge, or a 
business leader in the community who can point out to the 
class the value of a knowledge of commercial law in busi-
ness. There are also many excellent visual aids in the 
field of business law. 
5. The instructor should not convey the impression that 
business law is an isolated subject. Every opportunity 
should be seized to show the relationship between busi-
ness law and other areas such as economics, accounting, 
sales, salesmanship, problems of democracy, insurance and 
the entire sphere of business. 
~ 
6. It is advisable that several tests be given in addition 
to the mastery test. 'These tests may be given at any 
convenient point in the unit and need not be lengthy in 
nature. Tests which are primarily o~jective are adequate. 
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However, the author feels that some questions of an 
essay nature should be included. After all, one of the 
objectives of business law is to encourage logical and 
effective thinking and the ability to express one's 
thoughts. This goal should not be ignored in the giving 
of quizzes or examinations. 
7. The final suggestion is one which is not peculiar to the 
teaching of business law. It is not sufficient that the 
instructor have a mastery of the subject which he is 
teaching. He must be resourceful, able to get his ideas 
across, and present his material enthusiastically. Enthu-
siasm is contagious, but so is indifference. Either 
attitude by the teacher will be quickly reflected by the 
class. With proper preparation and motivation, the class 
in business law may be an extremely interesting and worth-
while experience for both the instructor and student. 
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